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Summary 
 
Well integrity is a result of technical, operational and organizational barriers applied, with the 
intention to contain and control the reservoir fluid and well pressures. Failure to obtain and 
maintain adequate barriers could lead to catastrophic events, like demonstrated in the Gulf of 
Mexico in 2010, with the Deepwater Horizon incident. Since then, the petroleum industry has 
experienced an increased focus on well integrity. 
 
Recent surveys conducted on the Norwegian Continental Shelf indicate shortcomings and 
insufficiencies regarding implementation of technical, operational and organizational barriers. 
Overview of the current well integrity on the NCS was also lacking. 
With the expected increase in well-operation activities on the Norwegian Continental Shelf 
the coming years, ensuring secure wells should be a main priority.  
 
Integrity of well barriers is a factor that must be included from the design and planning phase, 
and be present throughout the entire lifecycle of the well. Different challenges related to 
barriers do however present difficulties achieving this. Some of which, include accessibility 
and understanding of regulations and standards, technical implementation and long term 
effects of well barriers, and insufficient training and well integrity competence of personnel. 
  
By studying the causes of well incidents and blowouts, and by conducting surveys of wells 
and operating companies, a better overview of the different challenges and shortcomings 
resulting in these incidents, can be achieved. In order to prevent major accidents in the future, 
one must acknowledge and understand the past. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
 
 
Whenever a well is being planned, drilled, operated or abandoned, well integrity is always 
one of the most critical factors involved.  
The overburden rock which once held the formation fluid trapped in the reservoir is now 
being replaced with a hole in the ground. This hole will now act like a continuation of the 
reservoir itself and with the immense pressure a reservoir might exhibit, the need for well 
control is always a first priority.  
Without pressure containment, the well could start to leak or in worst case turn into a 
blowout. A situation as such would have major impact of economic and political proportions 
for a company, and also present a huge health and safety risk for the working personnel. It is 
therefore crucial to obtain and maintain proper well control in a safe manner in all phases of 
the wells life. 
 
Recent discoveries from surveys conducted on the Norwegian continental shelf (NCS) has in 
the recent years shown a negative trend with increasing well control incidents, hydrocarbon 
leakages and increased risk of major accidents. This is something the industry must address 
as the petroleum activities are expected to increase the coming years. The Deepwater Horizon 
incident in the Gulf of Mexico in 2010 reminded the world and the petroleum industry of the 
importance of well barriers and consequences of inadequate well integrity.   
 
Historically the primary focus has been on the construction phase of the well, with the goal of 
generating income. Little concern has been given to the final stages of the wells life, the 
plugging and abandonment (P&A), as this is a pure expense, nor how aspects in the 
operational phase affects well integrity. 
As a result, several of the operational and plugged wells on the NCS have insufficient well 
integrity and could present major issues in the time to come if they start to leak. Gaining 
access to many of these wells may be difficult, and remedial work could prove to be very 
costly. 
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This thesis presents some of the aspects of well integrity to consider for obtaining and 
maintaining adequate well integrity throughout the lifecycle of the well.  
 
Chapter two presents some of the factors to consider to achieve well integrity throughout the 
lifecycle of a well and gives an overview of the current well integrity on the NCS obtained 
through surveys conducted by the Petroleum Safety Authority and Well Integrity Forum. 
Annual surveys conducted the last decade have revealed trends in risk factors and well 
integrity issues affecting the Norwegian petroleum industry. 
 
In chapter three, a review of non-physical barriers is presented. 
Various countries regulatory regimes are discussed and some of the commonly used industry 
standards related to well integrity are presented. Other external barriers like controlling 
documents, procedures and new innovations are also presented with their related challenges. 
 
Chapter four goes into detail about the physical well barriers present in the well and the 
importance and challenges tied to these. 
 
There is also, in chapter six, case studies about some of the iconic blowout and well incidents 
the recent years, including the recent Elgin blowout, and how these happened as a result of 
barriers breaches.
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Chapter 2. Well Integrity 
 
 
Well integrity is a factor present in all the different phases of a well and relies on the 
existence of technical, organizational, and external barriers. Although no global definition of 
well integrity exists, one definition commonly used is found in the NORSOK D-010 
standard; “application of technical, operational and organizational solutions to reduce risk of 
uncontrolled release of formation fluid throughout the life cycle of a well”. 
 
To maintain adequate well integrity, special attention has to be made from the 
drilling/construction phase, through production/ injection/intervention phase, and even after 
plugging and abandoning the well. Problems can arise anywhere in the wells lifecycle, and 
can be as a result of formation induced problems, operation induced problems and human 
factors. Hydrocarbon leaks are one of the more serious problems that can occur, and could 
turn into a full blowout if it is not controlled or stopped. One of the biggest well control 
incidents in recent time, the Deepwater Horizon incident, stands as an example of how such a 
situation can unfold. 
 
A leak could be discovered by initial testing of a component, during the continuously 
monitoring during production or injection, or by a routine component leak test. 
Hydrocarbon leaks could occur as a result of wear, erosion, corrosion, fatigue, and could 
present itself in the casing, tubing, cement, BOP, packers or any other downhole equipment. 
Operational changes, causing change in pressure and temperature, could also result in a leak. 
Possible events where this could occur could be startup of production/injection, changing the 
production rate or shutting in the well.   
 
The well integrity management within a company should identify all potential hazards and 
problems for all the different phases of the well, in order to avoid and mitigate these. In order 
to do this, the wells pressure and temperature status should be continuously monitored, and 
routinely inspections should take place. Regulations and standards should also be understood 
and followed by all involved personnel dealing with well integrity. 
 Well Integrity 
 
4 
 
The past years, well integrity has gotten increasingly more focus, and experience based on 
recent events shows that even more focus is needed, as the oil industry faces an all-time high 
with regards to activity, both in drilling and plugging & abandonment. Focus should be added 
to qualification and long-term integrity of well barriers, and making sure regulations, 
standards and procedures are understood and followed. 
 
2.1 WELL INTEGRITY IN A LIFECYCLE ASPECT 
 
Historically, in terms of well integrity, the main focus has been on the planning and 
construction phase of the well, like where to place the casing shoes and what mud density 
should be used etc. (Lunde, 2012).  
In recent times, more focus has also been added to the plug and abandonment (P&A) phase as 
a lot of the older mature wells are in the process of being abandoned, and new technology and 
procedures within P&A are now starting to appear on the market. 
  
From the „Well integrity life cycle‟ presentation, given at the Well Integrity Workshop in 
May 26
th
, 2011 (Lunde, 2012), it is proposed that the focus should not only be on the 
construction or the P&A phase of the well, but on the entire lifecycle. This includes the 
operational phase of the well, as aspects in each of the wells lifecycle phases affect the wells 
integrity, even after they are plugged and abandoned.  
Listed below are some key points to keep in mind throughout the life of the well in order to 
obtain and maintain adequate well integrity (Lunde, 2012) (Aadnøy, et al., 2009) (Rygg, 
2006). 
 
2.1.1 Design & Planning 
 Design of the well should be optimized with respect to the formation in a specific area 
(Have integrity in all layers) 
 The design envelope should be fit for the planned purpose of the well 
 Casing design should take into account; Kick tolerance, Shallow Gas scenarios and 
Uncertainty of available data 
 Material selection with respect to corrosion/erosion 
 Avoidance of sustained casing pressure (SCP), cross flow and collapses 
 Well Integrity 
 
5 
 
 Monitoring capabilities in the well 
 Equipment reliability 
 Include well integrity personnel during the planning phase of the well 
 Plan should be revised by key personnel involved 
 Continuously revision of the plan in order to be one step ahead 
 Errors in the planning phase could be enhanced/magnified by insufficient well control 
knowledge during an operation  
 Insufficient organizational control/quality could cause or aggravate an incident   
 Contingencies should be in place at all times and well known in order to prevent 
unplanned quick fixes  
 Emergency response plans should be specified to the relevant well (Max blowout 
rates, possible kill methods and volumes, relief well placements, available rigs for 
relief well drilling)  
 
2.1.2 Placement of casing shoes 
 Placement of casing shoes has a big influence in both the drilling phase and the well 
integrity in a lifecycle approach 
 Casing shoes set in formation with enough strength to withstand reservoir pressure, 
gives increased safety, prolonged well life, reduced P&A costs and options with 
regards to reservoir barriers. 
 Placement of casing shoes and the isolation of these is deciding factor to avoid 
sustained casing pressure 
 
2.1.3 Isolation 
 The most important well barrier element and most difficult to establish and verify 
 Good isolation reduce the overall risk, including the possibility of SCP 
 Good isolation can increase lifetime of the well and reduce cost of workovers (WO) 
and P&A 
 Need more available types of isolation tools/medium to increase quality of isolation   
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2.1.4 Operating envelope 
 All personnel involved should have adequate well integrity competence 
 Every well should have clear operating envelopes and stay within these 
 Does change in drilling conditions affect initial plans?  
 Incidents going beyond the operating envelope shall be documented, reported and 
investigated 
 Avoid unneeded strain on well 
 Use the well for its designed purpose 
 
2.1.5 Systems and maintenance during operations 
 Preventive maintenance program on all relevant equipment optimized for the well 
 Knowledge of well safety and well control (Training of personnel) 
 Competent personnel and enough resources to maintain wells 
 Adequate well integrity management system (Task Force with sufficient technical 
competence formed in case of an incident?) 
 Proper handover process and documentation, procedures, steering documents and 
standards. 
 Experience transfer and knowledge sharing 
 
2.1.6 Slot recovery and P&A 
 Design, drilling, completion, operating, intervention and maintenance influence the 
P&A phase 
 P&A should be done as soon as possible once the well has stopped producing 
 Perform good P&A on existing wellbores before slot recovery. 
 Good isolation in well construction phase could reduce cost in P&A phase 
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2.2 WELL INTEGRITY STATUS ON THE NORWEGIAN 
CONTINENTAL SHELF 
 
The Norwegian Petroleum Safety Authority (PSA) has a vision of “Only secure wells on the 
Norwegian continental shelf”, and launched in 2006, a seminar with focus on well safety and 
the challenges the industry faces to prevent any major accidents from occurring (Ptil, 2006). 
The seminar had representatives from several companies and disciplines and discussed topics 
as increased attention to well safety, taking the whole life cycle of the well into account, but 
also sharing knowledge and experiences in order to increase the awareness and understanding 
around well integrity.  
 
Based on the issues discussed, it was concluded that:  
 The overview of well integrity and barriers is lacking in many cases, which could lead 
to serious well incidents if not addressed. 
 The increased complexity of wells requires increased competence of personnel and 
more advanced software in order to provide proper barriers for these wells. 
 Knowledge sharing and openness in the petroleum industry should be improved in 
order to increase our general understanding and competence around well integrity. 
Governmental cooperation across borders, with regards to regulations and standards 
would also contribute greatly to this.  
 
One of the subjects presented on the seminar was the well integrity pilot survey done by PSA 
in 2006 on the NCS. In addition to this, data has the recent years been collected continuously 
and published in annual PSA reports called Risikonivå I Norsk Petroleumsvirksomhet 
(RNNP). Results from the pilot survey and the most recent RNNP report, published April 25
th
 
2012 are presented below. 
 
2.2.1 Pilot survey conducted on the NCS - 2006 
The pilot survey was done based on a list of several issues that pointed to a lack of 
understanding and control around well integrity in the industry today. Information from the 
United Kingdom (UK) and Gulf of Mexico (GoM) indicated that several wells were suffering 
from integrity issues like structural failures, causing them to be shut in (Andreassen, 2006). 
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On the NCS there have also been several cases of well barrier failures happening in all stages 
of the wells life, and also an unsatisfied availability to critical information about the wells, 
like the wells integrity status and important well data. The purpose of the survey was to 
promote a more open discussion and knowledge sharing around these issues, in order to 
prevent any major accidents from happening in the future. 
 
The survey was based on around a fifth of the active producing and injecting wells on the 
NCS, adding up to 406 wells, divided amongst seven operating companies.  
 
Physical well barrier issues 
Out of the 406 wells investigated on the pilot survey, 75 wells (18.5%) presented with well 
integrity issues (Vignes, et al., 2006). Figure 1 show the amount of wells with issues or 
uncertainty related to specific Well Barrier Elements (WBE).   
 
  
 
Figure 1: Number of wells with related WBE issues [Based on (Vignes, 2012)] 
 
Tubing stands out as the WBE with most related issues, caused primarily by tubing leaks. 
The Annular Safety Valve (ASV), were reported with failures or leakages. Casings had 
reported leakages which were most likely due to non-gas tight connections. Some collapsed 
casings were also reported. The cement issues included lack of cement behind the casings, 
insufficient height of cement, and cement leakages due to either improper bonding to 
formation/casing or by micro annulus in the cement. Reported wellhead issues included 
inadequate sealing in the wellhead which caused leakages from A to B annulus. 
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Subsea wells had a low number of reported well incidents which could be explained by 
difficulties/limitations regarding monitoring. A lot of these wells could potentially have well 
integrity issues without being known. 
 
Non-physical barriers – Improvement potential 
A questionnaire were sent out to the operators in order to try to map how well the companies 
scored on organizational well integrity aspects and find out if there was room for 
improvement. The survey covered documentation, adherence to standards and defined 
practices, performance and competence. Figure 2 presents the areas where the companies had 
room for improvement regarding organizational barriers. 
 
   
 Figure 2: Room for improvement – Organizational barriers [Based on (Vignes, et al., 2006)] 
 
The most frequent issues were regarding well documentation, well handover documentation, 
regular condition monitoring, NORSOK D-010 standard compliance and well integrity 
competence.  
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2.2.2 Annual NCS surveys (RNNP) – 2001- 2011 
The RNNP reports focus primarily on risk indicators, investigating trends going back to 
1996. By looking at the trends for hydrocarbon leaks and well incidents, risk assessments can 
be made with regards to major accidents, well barrier failures and health, safety and 
environmental factors. Data is collected through studies, from PSAs databases and from 
reports received from the companies. Presented below, are results from the most recent 
published RNNP report. 
 
Situations related to risks of major accidents  
One of the more critical trends to investigate was the indicators for major accidents and the 
frequencies of these. The Deepwater Horizon accident in the GoM in 2010 demonstrates the 
consequences of such an event where a blowout ignited, causing fire and explosion, resulting 
in the death of 11 people, and several injuries. This is describes in more detail in chapter six.  
 
Figure 3 shows the trend of major accident risks based on reported DFUs (Defined situations 
of hazard and accident) (Ptil, 2012). The risk contribution for each of the various DFUs 
varies. 
 
Figure 3: Reported DFUs related to major accident risk (Ptil, 2012) 
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The trend shows a fairly consistent level of reported DFUs, with a slight increase in the 
period from 1996-2001. In 2002, the number increased a great deal, which according to PSA, 
might‟ve been due to underreporting of „Ship on collision course‟ incidents prior to 2002. 
„Well incidents‟ (green) and „Hydrocarbon leaks‟ (blue) might also been subjected to some 
underreporting, contributing to the low average in this period, but not to the same extent. The 
change in amount of reported DFUs from the1996-2001 period, to the 
2002 - 2011 period, is therefore not a good indication of the actual trend.  
 
In the period 2002-2007, a consistent annually reduction can be seen until 2007 where a 
slightly negative trend appears with increasing amount of reported DFUs. This trend can 
mainly be explained by the varying level of reported well incidents and hydrocarbon leaks. 
The negative trend of reported “Well incidents” seems however to have turned and are 
dramatically reduced in 2011. Reducing the risk of major accidents will continue to be one of 
PSAs main priorities in 2012. 
 
Looking at Figure 4, an increase in both number of exploration wells and mobile units can be 
seen, which again increases the possibility of potential well incidents (Ptil, 2012). This could 
explain the increase in reported DFUs and the increase of minor leaks in the period 2007-
2011.  
 
 
Figure 4: Trend of activity level for exploration, 1996-2011 (Ptil, 2012) 
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Number of hydrocarbon leaks in the process area 
A closer look at the hydrocarbon leaks exceeding 0.1 kg/s in the period 1996-2011 reveals a 
similar trend (Ptil, 2012). These leaks are situated in the process area and not in the wells. 
The results might go beyond the scope of this paper but the trends are however worth 
mentioning as they paint a picture of the organizational integrity.  
 
A positive trend with decreasing amount of leaks was seen in the period from 1996-1999, 
followed by some years with large variations. From 2003-2007 a positive trend was again 
seen, until 2007 when the trend turned and stabilized at a slightly higher level. The results 
from 2011 seem to be at the same low level as in 2007, with a shift towards minor leaks. 
 
 
Figure 5: Number of hydrocarbon leaks exceeding 0.1 kg/s, 1996-2011 (Ptil, 2012) 
 
 
The negative trend the recent years could be explained by the increased activity seen in the 
previous figure, or by better incident reporting.  
 
There are big differences between operator companies regarding amount of hydrocarbon 
leaks. Figure 6 shows amount of leaks exceeding 0.1 kg/s for ten different operating 
companies on the NCS in the period 2007-2011.  
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Figure 6: Average leak frequency, 2007-2011 (Ptil, 2012) 
 
This graph only take into account the last five years, but the differences seen between the 
companies have remained more or less the same for many years (Ptil, 2012). Looking at 
individually installations reveals that the five installations with the highest average leak 
frequencies, accountable for over 30% of the leaks on the NCS in this period, are under the 
same operating company.  
 
This shows that there is room for improvement and that by knowledge sharing, operating 
companies could learn from each other in order to reduce the amount of hydrocarbon leaks. 
Another explanation could be different incident reporting cultures between the companies. 
 
 
Well control incident – Blowout potential 
As seen previously in Figure 3, the trend for reported DFUs, well incidents contribute a great 
deal to the observed trend. 
Figure 7 and Figure 8 shows the amount of well incidents for both exploration and production 
drilling per 100 drilled wells in the period, 1996-2010 (Ptil, 2012). 
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For exploration drilling, big variations can be seen throughout the period. In the period 2005-
2008 a positive trend with significantly decreasing amount of well incidents can be observed, 
followed by a sharp increase in well incidents the latest years from 2008. This is the result of 
a significantly increase in shallow gas incidents reported. The big variations are not 
surprising, and can be explained by drilling in unknown geology. 
 
 
Figure 7: Reported well incidents - Exploration drilling, 1996-2010 (Ptil, 2012) 
 
For production drilling, an increasing trend from 1996 is seen with minor variations, ending 
with a peak in 2003. In the period 2003-2008 a positive trend with decreasing well incidents 
is seen with a sharp increase from 2008-2010, mainly caused by an increase in „regular‟ 
events. Results from 2011 indicate a very good year with only a few regular events.  
 
 
Figure 8: Reported well incidents - Production drilling, 1996-2010 (Ptil, 2012) 
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2.2.3 Classification of wells on the NCS 
In 2008, the Well Integrity Forum (WIF) launched a project aimed towards classifying all 
active wells in terms of the well integrity risk they possess (Ptil, 2012). Ten operating 
companies contributed with data from 1757 active wells, excluding exploration wells and 
plugged wells. The following classification were used;  
 
Red:   One barrier failed and the other degraded/unverified or with external leak. 
Orange:  One barrier failed and the other intact, or a single fault which may cause 
leaking into external environment. 
Yellow:  One barrier leaking within acceptance criteria or the barrier is degraded, and 
the other is intact. 
Green:  Intact well, with no insignificant integrity factors. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9: Classification of active wells on NCS – 2011 (Ptil, 2012) 
 
 
Figure 9 shows the status of the wells on the NCS in 2011, with 8,7% of the wells being in 
the red and orange category. This signifies 153 wells not meeting the requirements with two 
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barriers, and therefore being prone to leaking or loss of well control. 18,3%, or 321 of the 
wells are also in the yellow category, meaning one barrier is degraded or with a small leak, 
but the operator has implemented compensating measures in order to meet the two-barrier 
requirements. These could potentially turn into red or orange wells over time. 
 
An example of how a company, ConocoPhillips in this case, document their well 
classification for a given platform is shown in Figure 10. Wells are listed downwards with a 
color and comment indicating the well classification according to WIF color regime. All the 
annuli pressures are displayed and given a color related to the pre-set design pressures. 
 
With this system, the engineers can quickly navigate between platforms and wells and obtain 
an overview of their status. 
 
 
Figure 10: Well classification in ConocoPhillips (ConocoPhillips, 2012) 
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2.2.4 Follow up survey – 2012 
After the initial survey done by PSA, a follow up survey including all wells that was not 
active or permanent plugged, was done by PSA together with SINTEF and Wellbarrier 
(Vignes, 2012) 
It showed that 193 wells in the NCS are today temporary plugged, and some of them have 
been for over 30 years (Ptil, 2012). This number is about five times the bigger than was 
previously believed. The companies responsible for these wells include BP, ConocoPhillips, 
ExxonMobil, Lundin, AS Norske Shell, Statoil, Talisman and Total. 
 
Temporary plugged wells only require mechanical plugs in the wellbore, which are not 
accepted as barrier elements for permanent plugged wells, and are only meant to be used for a 
shot period. Reducing the amount of temporary abandoned wells is one of the focus points of 
PSA. 
 
 
 
Figure 11: Classification of non-active & non-permanent plugged wells on NCS - 2012 (Vignes, 2011) 
 
The results of the follow up survey can be seen in Figure 11. 
62% (119 wells), of the wells looked into are in the green category meaning they have 
acceptable well barrier status, with minor or no issues. The remaining 38% (74 wells) of the 
wells have various degrees of barrier failures which could lead to unwanted release of 
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formation fluids at any time. Of these wells, 29% (57 wells) are of the yellow category, with 
one barrier degraded and other intact, while 8% (15 wells) are in the orange category, where 
one barrier has failed and the other intact, or a single failure may lead to leak to surface. 
The more alarming number is the 1% (2 wells) that is in the red category, where one barrier 
has failed and the other is degraded, or both barriers have failed and a leak is present. These 
represent a big liability for the oil companies and should be dealt with immediately. 
 
After some cooperation between PSA and the relevant operating companies, all the wells in 
red and orange category are now either permanent plugged or are scheduled for permanent 
P&A. It‟s unknown how long it will take until every single one of these wells are secured, but 
PSA will follow up the progress throughout 2012 (Vignes, 2012).
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Chapter 3. Barriers in a wider perspective 
 
 
To have full well integrity, implies that well control is obtained and maintained throughout 
the lifecycle of the well by a set of tested and verified barriers which reduce the risk of 
uncontrolled release of formation fluids. (NORSOK Standard D-010, 2004) 
A barrier is defined as any measure or action done to reduce or prevent an unwanted situation 
to arise (Ptil, 2012). This could include leakage or spills of hydrocarbons, either to surface or 
to another formation, or health and safety related incidents to the personnel on the rig. 
 
Barriers are needed even from the planning and early construction phase and all the way 
through the operational phase and beyond permanent plug and abandonment phase to ensure 
full well integrity of the well at all times. Barriers can be categorized in many ways and one 
way is to define them as non-physical barriers (external, organizational and active) and 
physical barriers (well barriers). 
 
As seen on the surveys conducted on the NCS, there are shortcomings with regards to both 
physical and non-physical barriers. Some of the non-physical barriers required for well 
integrity are discussed on the following pages, while the physical barriers are discussed in 
more detail later on in chapter four. 
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3.1 EXTERNAL BARRIERS 
 
External barriers are measures to ensure well integrity from a superior point of view. These 
are barriers affecting the industry as a whole and include laws, regulations and standards.  
 
3.1.1 Laws and regulations 
At the highest level, there are laws and regulations. These dictate the minimum requirements 
that have to be followed by the industry operating in the respective countries. Every aspect of 
the industry and every country have their own set of regulations that has to be followed. 
 
Norwegian regulations 
In Norway the regulations are governed by the Petroleum Safety Authority (PSA). 
The following regulations for onshore and offshore petroleum activities in addition to related 
guidelines apply (Ptil, 2012); 
 
Framework HSE Regulations 
“Regulations related to health, safety and environment in the petroleum activities and at 
certain onshore facilities. (Ptil, 2012)” 
 
Management Regulations 
“Regulations related to management and the duty to provide information in the petroleum 
activities and at certain onshore facilities. (Ptil, 2012)” 
 
Facilities Regulations 
“Regulations related to design and outfitting of facilities, etc. in the petroleum activities. 
(Ptil, 2012)” 
 
Activities Regulations 
“Regulations related to conducting petroleum activities. (Ptil, 2012)” 
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Technical and Operational Regulations 
“Regulations related to technical and operational matters at onshore facilities in the 
petroleum activities. (Ptil, 2012)” 
 
The Norwegian regulations are known for being solid and well-established and have high 
emphasis on occupational health, safety, and environment. The regulations which are mainly 
based on risk assessments, apply to every aspect of the petroleum industry. 
 
 
UK regulations 
In the UK, the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) and the Department of Energy and 
Climate Change (DECC) are the regulators within the oil and gas industry (Oil and Gas UK, 
2012). Offshore, onshore and pipeline safety, are all administered by the same authority, but 
are governed by separate legislations. Regulations are mainly risk based, with some 
exceptions which are prescriptive, and the operator must prepare and implement a formal 
safety case and a safety management system (GL Noble Denton, 2010). The concept of 
reducing the risk to As Low As Reasonable Possible (ALARP) originated in the UK. 
 
 
Danish regulations 
In Denmark, offshore and onshore facilities, as well as marine matters and vessel regulations, 
all have separate regulators. The Danish Energy Agency (DEA) is the regulator for all 
offshore safety matters, while the Danish Environmental Protection Agency (DEPA) and 
Danish Working Environment Authority (DWEA) regulate onshore matters. Matters 
regarding marine and vessels are regulated by The Danish Maritime Authority. 
The regulations require risk management and use goal-setting processes to achieve this. A 
great deal of subsidiary legislations, covering very specific aspects of design and operations 
makes the Danish regime stand out (GL Noble Denton, 2010) 
 
European regulations 
Günther Oettinger, Commissioner for Energy in The European Union (EU), presented in 
October 2011 a proposal for a set of standardized HSE regulations, applying to all offshore 
installations in Europe (Førde, 2012). These regulations cover the entire lifecycle aspect of 
the well, from design of the well to decommissioning and removal of the installation. 
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The proposal has received mixed responses.  
The Norwegian petroleum industry, and the Norwegian Minister for Energy, Ola Borten 
Moe, are united in the matter and are protesting against this new proposal. It is claimed that 
the EU has very little competence regarding offshore activities and an intervention might 
cause negative consequences. It would require changing existing, well established regulations 
for new regulations, which would be a major risk factor.   
The British Minister for Energy, Charles Hendry supports the Norwegian petroleum industry 
in the protest and claims both the Norwegian and the UK have some of the most solid and 
robust safety regimes in the world which should not be compromised. He is against a 
supranational decree, where the EU imposed regulations stand above the national regulations 
for each country. He is however open for a directive, where countries can pick whatever they 
feel is relevant and add to their own regulations.         
  
Bellona on the other hand, supports the introduction of common European regulations for 
offshore installations. This is based on the indicators for major accidents the recent years, as 
presented in the PSA surveys done on the NCS.    
 
 
US regulations 
In the US, as of October 2011, the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (BOEM) and the 
Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE), formerly known as the Minerals 
Management Service (MMS), are the active regulations that apply in the US (Bureau of 
Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement, 2012). In addition to these 
regulations, every state has a separate set of regulations that apply (Collins, 2012). 
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Comparison of regulation regimes, Norway vs. US 
After the Deepwater Horizon accident, Det Norske Veritas (DNV) conducted a study 
mapping the differences between regulation regimes between the NCS and the US. 
A summary of the differences are presented in  
Table 1 (Det Norske Veritas, 2010); 
 
Table 1: Summary of the DNV report – Main differences in regulation regimes 
Main differences in regulation regimes 
  Norway US 
Regulations are mainly function based; 
meaning clear goals are set for safety level 
and functional requirements. 
 
Regulations are mainly prescriptive. 
Regulations are mainly risk based, 
meaning activities are always built on 
identified risks, systematic working to 
reduce risk levels, and priorities should 
reflect current risk levels. 
 
No such requirements. 
The resource management and the health, 
safety and environmental (HSE) 
management are separately managed by 
two authorities. 
 
Both resource and HSE are handled by the 
same authority. 
PSA have a coordinating role in the 
development and follow up of any HSE 
implementations. 
 
No coordinating authority. 
The operating company has the 
responsibility that all petroleum activities 
are in line with the governing regulations. 
 
Responsibility of petroleum activities is 
shared amongst the operator and the 
government. 
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Additional differences were found with regards to management systems for safety and 
environment, requirements to drilling and well operations, requirements related to equipment. 
One of the major differences was the systematic use of two independent, tested well barriers 
for all well operations, which is require in Norway. No similar requirements to well barriers 
were found in the US regulations.  
 
3.1.2 Standards 
Standards are there to ensure continuity of the work being done, in terms of having the right 
tools for the job, reliable equipment and correct procedures. Standards also work as a sharing 
of good management practices and technological advances and function as guides for how to 
meet laws and regulations (Ptil, 2012). 
The importance of standards is mostly noticed in their absence, which may lead to poor 
quality regarding products or work practices, equipment that does not fit or unreliable tools, 
or in worst case, breach of regulations. Standards exist at different levels, from international 
to national and industry levels. Listed below are some of the standards related to well 
integrity being used today. 
 
ISO (International Organization for Standardization) 
ISO is a network of the national standards institutes, including 163 countries, and is per date 
the world‟s largest developer and publisher of international standards with over 18500 
standards published (ISO, 2011). The ISO standards are developed by a technical committee 
comprised of industry experts from various countries. When a new ISO standard is being 
developed, delegates from various countries have a discussion until they reach an agreement.  
 
API (The American Petroleum Institute) 
API is a national trade association which represents companies of varying sizes and 
disciplines in the American oil and gas industry (API, 2011).    
Their focus is primarily domestic, but has in the recent years expanded to a more 
international focus as the industry has grown. 
API has extensive experience with development of standards, dating back to 1924 and 
represents the collective wisdom from the industry. Currently, over 500 standards are 
maintained. Many of the API standards have lately been adopted by ISO and have also 
influenced the state and federal regulations.  
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NORSOK (The Competitive Standing of the Norwegian Offshore Sector) 
NORSOK, as mentioned earlier, was originally a project aimed towards reducing the 
execution time and cost of any operations on petroleum installations, on the Norwegian 
continental shelf (Gundersen, 2012). The project was a collaborative between The Norwegian 
Oil Industry Association (OLF), Federation of Norwegian Manufacturing Industries (TBL) 
and the Norwegian government. One of the outcomes from this collaboration was a set of 
standards, which are now being used as internal guidelines for most of the oil companies 
operating on the Norwegian continental shelf. Standards Norway is responsible for the 
administration and publishing of these standards, which is available at 
www.standardnorge.no. 
 
The NORSOK D-010 standard, “Well integrity in drilling and well operations” has its focus 
on well integrity, and contains definitions, requirements and guidelines for well design, 
planning and execution of well operations (NORSOK Standard D-010, 2004). 
 
The standard contains well drawings which depicts the barrier status for all the relevant well 
barrier elements in that particular type of well, and is an example of how a well barrier 
schematic could be made. This is done for wells with different well configurations and for all 
the different phases of the well, including drilling phase, well intervention, operational phase 
and plug and abandonment phase. See Appendix A. 
A set of tables describing the acceptance criteria for all the different well barrier elements is 
also included in the standard. See Appendix B. 
 
The standard is based on the international standards like ISO and API with additional 
provisions to cover the needs for the Norwegian petroleum industry. As oppose to the 
international standards, the NORSOK standard is developed by the industry itself to ensure 
the quality and relevance the industry needs. It is also as far as possible, intended to replace 
oil company specifications and be used as reference in the authorities‟ regulations (NORSOK 
Standard D-010, 2004).  
 
 
Standards in global terms 
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In many countries, no specific well integrity standard exists. A lot of countries do however 
use guidelines or standards, but not as detailed and substantial as NORSOK D-010. In the US 
and UK, the standards are both managed by the same authority as the regulations. Greenland 
however has started using NORSOK in their drilling operations (Nielsen, 2011).  
 
As of today, no global standard exists. An ideal goal would be to internationalize a standard, 
and making sure it is easy to understand and use, while maintaining a high quality. The API / 
ISO standards are very detailed, but are not as user friendly as NORSOK D-010. In addition, 
the ISO and other standards are not free and available on the web to the same degree as 
NORSOK is (Enoksen, 2006). 
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3.1.3 International Well Control Forum (IWCF) 
After the formation of the European Union, a committee of National Energy Ministries, 
Industry Trade Associations and Trade Unions came with recommendations of introducing a 
standard training syllabus and certification program for drilling, workover and intervention 
personnel (IWCF, 2010). A few years later, a working party, later known as European Well 
Control Forum (EWCF), consisting of representatives from seven different countries within 
Europe was formed to assess the well control skills of the industry in Europe and create a 
matching well integrity certification program. Throughout this process, input from the 
international petroleum industry was received. The following years, the number of countries 
involved grew from seven to sixteen, many of these outside Europe. The working party was 
later renamed, International Well Control Forum (IWCF). 
 
The IWCF‟s primary focus remains to administer well control certification programs for any 
personnel involved in drilling, workover or intervention operations. 
This qualified certification program helps to maintain and improve the skills and knowledge 
about well control for drilling, workover and intervention personnel and contributes 
positively to the safety in well operations, and is therefore a valued barrier.   
 
The NORSOK D-010 standard is currently being used as curriculum for certification 
regarding well service operations (well intervention) and is also on the way to become a part 
of the drilling and well operations curriculum (Sørskår, 2012).   
 
3.1.4 Well Integrity Forum (WIF) 
In 2007, a workgroup underlying OLF called Well Integrity Forum (WIF) was established. Its 
main purpose was to promote open discussions regarding well integrity related issues 
affecting different operators on the NCS.  
One of the key topics initially discussed in the forum was the quality of well integrity training 
(OLF, 2010). Members of WIF recognized a need for well integrity training for key personnel 
working with well integrity, both on- and offshore, something that was also found in PSAs 
earlier well integrity survey.  
 
 Barriers in a wider perspective 
 
28 
 
The relevant personnel consisted of; 
 
1. Production operation personnel offshore 
2. Production operation personnel onshore 
3. Drilling/completion/intervention onshore 
4. Rig Contractors like drillers and tool pushers 
5. Service-company engineers and operators with delegated responsibilities in well 
integrity  
 
A survey was conducted, mapping different operators well integrity practices, experiences 
and opinions, which would serve as a basis for the well integrity training guideline. As a 
result, WIF came up with a training course consisting of; 
 
1. Well Integrity fundamentals 
2. NORSOK D-010 terminology and principles 
3. Company specific training (test procedures, well design and internal requirements) 
 
Another issue discussed in WIF was the handover documentation process. This was also one 
of the issues raised by PSA in their integrity survey, where the availability, knowledge and 
content of the well handover documentation could be improved. 
A survey done by WIF showed that most companies had exceeded the NORSOK D-010 
Standard regarding well handover documentation by also including a Well Barrier Schematic 
(WBS) which had been developed, using NORSOK D-010 Standard as a basis of design. The 
structure of the well handover documentation was left for the operators to decide, however a 
set of minimum requirements was made regarding well construction data, well diagrams, 
handover certificate and operating input.    
 
In attempts to standardize the WBS and get a common format within the industry, WIF made 
some guidelines describing a set of common minimum requirements to be included in the 
WBS; 
1. The formation strength should be indicated for formation within the barrier envelopes. 
2. Reservoir(s) should be shown on the drawing. 
3. Each barrier element in both barrier envelopes should be presented in a table along 
with its initial integrity-verification test result. 
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4. Depths should be shown relatively correct according to each barrier element on the 
drawing. 
5. All casing and cement, including the surface casing, should be on the drawing and 
labeled with its size. 
6. There should be separate fields for the following well information: Installation, well 
name, well type, well status rev. no and date, “Prepared by”, “Verified/Approved by”. 
7. Include a Note field for important well integrity information 
   
ConocoPhillips has in the period 2011-2012 made a new unique tool for generating WBS. 
This is described in more detail in section “3.2.6 Well Barrier Schematics”. 
 
3.1.5 P&A Forum (P&AF) 
In the upcoming years it is expected that a lot of the current wells and installations on the 
NCS have to be plugged and abandoned. It is approximated that during the period 2011-2040, 
about 2000 wells are going to be abandoned, in addition to about 200 wells which are 
temporary abandoned (Ringøen, 2011).  
 
To prepare for the upcoming P&A challenges on the NCS and find cost effective solutions, a 
Plug and Abandonment Forum was established in November 2009 after an initiative from 
ConocoPhillips Norway P&A workshop (OLF, 2011). The P&A forum, which is a 
workgroup underlying OLF, work together with PSA regarding regulation requirements, 
industry standards and guidelines. The forum also cooperates with the service industry with 
regards to new requirements, technology, materials and methods, in order to achieve better 
well integrity. Sharing of case stories between operators also contribute to a better 
understanding. At the moment, nine operating companies are currently listed as members of 
the P&A Forum; ConocoPhillips, Shell, Statoil, DetNorske, BP, Total, Centrica Energi, 
Talisman Energy and Eni. 
On the UKCS, a similar work group exists, called Oil & Gas UK Decommissioning Steering 
Group (Oil and Gas UK, 2010). This forum drives the industry forward with regards to P&A 
knowledge through sharing of technology, methods, guidelines and case stories. With the rise 
in P&A operations the industry will face the coming years, the result from this initiative will 
serve as a solid foundation and barrier towards the challenges the P&A operations presents.   
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3.2 ORGANIZATIONAL BARRIERS 
 
One of the first lines of defense against uncontrolled incidents, both HSE and well integrity 
related, is by having a solid organization with good standard of quality on everything they do. 
This includes a variety of aspects, like good working culture and philosophies, good 
documentation control like detailed and clear well records, good internal standards and so on. 
Unlike external barriers, the organizational barriers only affect the respective companies. 
Some of the organizational barriers within a typical company are discussed below.  
 
3.2.1 Integrated Operations 
Nowadays, a lot of the offshore activities have been moved onshore, by the use of integrated 
operations (I/O) also known as real time operations. I/O can be defined as activity where 
information is transferred through network system to remote users, operators or managing 
systems in order to tie together different professions and branches and improve capacity and 
result to a reduced cost (Kaland, et al.). 
Operators onshore may sit in operation centers with all the available data from offshore and 
more. Here, engineers from different disciplines could work together and make better 
solutions in real-time. 
With these I/O centers, better decisions can be made and help to strengthen the overall safety 
and reduce cost by saving time. 
 
3.2.2 Controlling documents 
Controlling documents is a very general term and includes a wide range of processes, 
procedures, rules & regulations and standards. The controlling documents can be global, 
national, and local documents, both internal and external and may vary from company to 
company, or between different nations. 
 
In Norway, the PSA‟s rules and regulations apply (Ptil, 2012). Regulation guidelines describe 
how to meet these rules and regulations and also refer to NORSOK standards and OLF 
guidelines. Additional requirements beyond these standards and guidelines may also apply 
within a company.  
Internal company documents may include procedures and processes and govern well 
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activities and risk management. Some examples of activities and operations governed by 
these documents include, drilling, cementing, intervention, well testing. Other documents 
may include bridging documents, describing procedures for when different rules and 
standards meet. For instance when a service company operates on a rig, working for an 
operating company, the bridging documents describes whose rules, standards and procedures 
to follow.  
 
The controlling documents affect a wide span of aspects, from well integrity, to personnel 
health and safety, and risk & cost management. Considering how much the controlling 
documents affects safety, they are very important barriers, both as external barriers and 
organizational barriers. 
 
3.2.3 Management of Change 
A change in procedures and processes could lead to serious safety or operational incidents if 
the changes are not properly documented and implemented correctly. Management of Change 
(MOC) is a process of handling these types of changes in a controlled manner where 
modifications are recognized, documented, reviewed and approved before they are 
implemented (ConocoPhillips, 2012) (Matre, 2009).  
Every company business unit may use their own internal guidelines for MOC, but generally 
the following steps apply: 
1. Initiate/Propose change 
2. Define 
3. Approve 
4. Carry out 
5. Follow-up 
 
Minor changes from planned operational programs could be handled by documenting, 
approving and communicated to the appropriate personnel and might not need a MOC 
(ConocoPhillips, 2012). For more significantly changes, the MOC procedure should take 
place.  
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This includes changes regarding: 
 basic well design 
 pressure containing envelope 
 introduction to new non-routine or unplanned operations that may affect safety 
 well control procedures 
 key personnel or organizational structure 
 contractor agreements 
 operational changes 
 new equipment or modifications 
 
As MOC could prevent both safety and operational related issues, it is considered to be an 
important barrier.  
 
3.2.4 Audits / Revisions  
According to PSAs Framework regulations, the operator shall follow up and quality check 
steering documents and procedures in order to ensure that both HSE and well integrity is met 
in a satisfactory way. This is done by performing audits on the steering documents and 
procedures and making sure they are followed and understood.  
Equipment shall be routinely investigated and tested, as well as the contractors delivering this 
equipment. The audit of the operator company itself is done internally, as well as being done 
by the government, operating partners and contractors. 
 
These audits and revisions are an important barrier as they help to maintain a high quality 
standard of the work done by the operator companies as well as the contractors. It also helps 
to maintain the integrity of barrier-related equipment and HSE.  
 
3.2.5 Well Handover & Documentation 
As a well is drilled and completed, a comprehensive well documentation is made in order to 
make sure everyone involved knows the status of the well and all the equipment installed. 
The handover process consists of several procedures and describes the required information 
needed, and the people responsible for providing this.  
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This information includes well characteristics like type of well, depths, casing program, 
completion equipment, and any non-conformances. 
 
 
Figure 12: Well handover process for ConocoPhillips (ConocoPhillips, 2012) 
 
This example of a well handover process in ConocoPhillips describes actions to be taken 
when handing over a well from drilling/completion to operations. The responsible persons are 
listed on top, connected to various tasks and responsibilities. 
Letters describe the level of responsibility (Inform, consult, responsible, accountable), and on 
the right hand side, links to relevant documents are provided. 
 
 Barriers in a wider perspective 
 
34 
 
3.2.6 Well Barrier Schematics 
One of the documents required during well handover is a graphical representation of the well, 
showing the well barriers, called Well Barrier Schematic (WBS). Examples of how to present 
a WBS is shown in the NORSOK D-010 standard. These are meant as a guideline and show 
the minimal required expectations. Most companies have their own way to making WBS 
documents which exceeds what is shown in NORSOK D-010. 
 
A WBS should show the well with all the casings installed, and all well barrier elements 
installed (NORSOK Standard D-010, 2004). The primary barrier should be presented in its 
normal working stage and the secondary barrier in its ultimate stage, which means the shear 
ram or shear valve is closed. A table of performed pressure tests should also be included. 
 
The WBS is an important document that gives a quick and good overview of the well and the 
well barriers status. 
 
Well Barrier Schematic application – ConocoPhillips project 
In 2010, ConocoPhillips Norway started a project aimed towards making Well Barrier 
Schematics (WBS) more efficiently and more reliable. The goal with the project was to 
develop an application that would generate WBS‟s automatically with the latest available 
data found in the ConocoPhillips‟ well database, WellView.  
Peloton, the provider of WellView, were chosen to develop the WBS software. 
  
My involvement in the project 
I started working on this project summer 2011 and have been involved with it since.  
To make sure the application generated WBS‟s that met both the Norwegian and 
ConocoPhillips‟ standards and requirements, I had to comprehend the complex subject of 
well integrity principles. This was done by studying the NORSOK D-010 standard, 
Norwegian regulations, OLF 117 – Well integrity guideline and from discussions with the 
well integrity team and well intervention team at ConocoPhillips. 
 
Together with the software developers from Peloton; the provider of WellView, work began 
to make sure the application functioned properly and generated acceptable WBS‟s. This work 
included thoroughly testing of the software, providing feedback and instructions to the 
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developers with regards to enhancements and bug-fixing and continuously meetings with 
developers and well integrity personnel. While doing this, well data had to be added and 
corrected in Wellview, thus providing ConocoPhillips with a more robust well database. I 
have also written an extensive user-guide to the add-in, explaining in detail how the program 
works, which data the program relies on and how to correctly enter these data in order to get 
the add-in to function properly.  
 
The WBS application is scheduled to be deployed within ConocoPhillips Norway by end of 
June 2012, and globally within ConocoPhillips by the end of 2012. As the program is 
developed by a third-party (Peloton), ConocoPhillips does not wish to take patent on the 
program. This means the add-in will be available for other companies using Pelotons 
WellView database.  
 
As a result of my work I‟m now a member of a global well barrier expert team, whose 
assignment is to implement the software globally and provide necessary support. 
 
Previously procedure in ConocoPhillips 
Previously, the WBS‟s were made manually by engineers with programs like Autocad, 
Completion String Design and most recently, Microsoft PowerPoint (Figure 13).  
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Figure 13: Well barrier schematic made by PowerPoint (ConocoPhillips, 2012) 
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Data was first gathered from the ConocoPhillips well database, WellView, and then added to 
the PowerPoint. Casing strings, cement, tubing string, gas lift valves, packers, reservoir 
depth, perforations, FIT/LOT data was some of the data that had to be reproduced, in addition 
to pressure test related to every WBE, a very time consuming process. Secondly, if any 
changes occurred in the database after the WBS had been made, they would be rendered 
outdated and incorrect. 
 
Functionality of the new WBS add-in 
The new WBS application work as an add-in (a software program that extends the 
capabilities of a larger program (Webopedia, 2012)) to the existing WellView database. By 
doing this, the application could be linked directly to the well data stored in WellView, 
ensuring that it always presents the latest available data. Making the add-in reliant on 
WellView data, forcing engineers to enter data more thoroughly and in the correct data fields, 
will also work as a quality assurance by building a more complete database.   
  
When the WBS application is run, it gathers the data needed from WellView and renders a 
complete WBS ready to be verified and signed by engineers. Every relevant well barrier 
element is drawn at their correct depth and every conducted pressure test is listed in a 
separate table. Barrier logic is also built into the application, so that the primary and 
secondary barrier envelopes are immediately recognized and drawn in blue and red, in line 
with NORSOK D-010. It is designed so that it would not only meet the requirements for the 
current NORSOK D-010 standard (rev. 3), but also some of the changes that is going to be 
presented in the next revision of NORSOK D-010 (rev. 4) (Lunde, 2012). 
The add-in automatically decides, based on information in the database, if this is a drilling 
well, production well or a P&A well, thus saving the user time and effort, as different barrier 
principles and rules apply in the different situations. 
 
This semi real-time function makes this a truly unique and valued documentation tool. 
Everyone with access to the database would have access to the latest available WBS, a 
concept that other documentation tools could benefit greatly from.  
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Figure 14: Well Barrier Schematic made by the new WBS application (ConocoPhillips, 2012) 
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Improvements made to the WBS 
 
The previous used WBS, made in PowerPoint, was used as a starting point for the new WBS 
design. However, two major changes have been made. See Figure 14. 
 
The most obvious change is the component annotations on the left hand side.  
In the previous WBS, the whole component name was listed as well as the MD and TVD 
depth of this component. The component name was then duplicated on the right hand side 
table with the relevant pressure test information and test date. 
In the new WBS design provided by the add-in, the component name on the left hand side has 
been exchanged by a short one-letter annotation in addition to a number. This provides a 
cleaner look, and makes it easier to read and interpret the well diagram. 
The letter indicates the barrier status of the component; Primary (P), Secondary (S), or Other 
(O), and the number correlates to the components position in the right hand side table. These 
annotations are re-calculated every time the add-in is launched, so if a barrier element 
changes barrier status or depth, the annotation will be update accordingly.  
The right hand side table now provides all the information; component name, depths, dates 
and tests conducted. Any additionally annotations or comments can be manually added 
through the add-ins user interface. Fishes, collapses, leaks, packers etc. can also be added.  
 
The other major change is more subtle, yet very important. In the previous WBS, the barrier 
logic for each barrier element had to be decided by the person making the WBS, and then 
later verified by an engineer. This could be a potential source of error, as well barriers is a 
complex subject, drawing the correct barrier logic for every single component could prove to 
be a challenge, especially when engineers have different views and opinions of how they 
should be. 
 
In the new add-in, this problem is solved as the barrier logic is implemented in the code, 
making no room for error. Exceptions can be made off course, by overriding the 
automatically selected barrier status through the add-ins user interface. If the status of a 
barrier element is changed, the add-in re-calculates the barrier status of all the other barrier 
elements, thus not only providing the user with feedback on how the rest of the barrier 
elements are affected, but also saving the user a lot of work. 
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An example of how this works is seen in Figure 15, where the downhole safety valve 
(DHSV) has been changed from „Primary‟ barrier status, to „Other‟ barrier status manually 
through the add-in user interface, indicating a problem with the DHSV. 
 
     
Figure 15: Manually changing barrier status of a well component (ConocoPhillips, 2012) 
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As seen on the right schematic in Figure 15, the primary barrier envelope is moved out 
because the tubing no longer functions as a primary barrier, because of a barrier breach in the 
DHSV. Note that the 13 5/8” casing is not automatically defined as a secondary barrier, 
because the 13 5/8” casing shoe might not be able to withstand the reservoir pressure. A 
decision to make this a secondary barrier element could be made by the engineer verifying 
the schematic.  
 
Also note the striped color on the 13 5/8” casing cement on the left schematic. This indicates 
that there is cement present here, but the cement does not fulfill the required height of 200m. 
This is one of the many barrier logics implemented in the add-in. Every height requirement 
can be changed in a separate file that comes with the program, in case any other business unit 
has other requirements. 
 
The add-ins logic is mainly based on the current NORSOK Standard D-010 rev.3; however, 
the add-in also extends beyond what is specified in NORSOK and will implement logic that 
is likely to be presented in the next revision of NORSOK Standard. 
 
The „striped‟ cement is one of the new features this add-in contains. Another feature is having 
the primary barrier start at the top of the reservoir, as opposed to inside the reservoir as 
pictured in the NORSOK standard, as it is not a valid barrier element in this section. Also 
note that primary reservoir barrier (cement), is drawn all the way out to formation to indicate 
the importance of cement-formation bonding.  
 
Future implementations 
Finishing touches are currently being made to the add-in with regards to its drilling and P&A 
functionality. This includes bug-testing, adding any additional functionality and finally 
publishing. Current status of these functionalities can be seen on Figure 16. 
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Figure 16: Drilling (left) and P&A (right) functionality of the WBS add-in (ConocoPhillips, 2012) 
  
 Barriers in a wider perspective 
 
43 
 
These modes are designed to be of the same quality as the production-mode. Not only 
meeting the NORSOK D-010 standard, but going beyond what is required and making sure 
the barriers are well defined. An example could be the cement plugs in the P&A scenario. 
Only plugs cemented out to the formation (or with good verified cement outside) are defined 
as valid barrier elements. The add-in automatically figures out the barrier status of the plugs, 
based on cement data and milled/under-reamed sections from the well data. 
 
Conclusion 
The WBS add-in tool is a very powerful and easy-to-use tool which can be extremely useful, 
not only for ConocoPhillips but also other companies who uses Pelotons, Wellview database. 
The add-in not only represents the actual well data in a reliable and effortless way, but also 
implements complex, up-to-date barrier logic, saving the engineers a lot of work and time. As 
it relies on good well data, companies are also forced to quality check and control their data, 
providing a more robust and more reliable database. The add-in does not currently have the 
functionality to display advanced wells like multi-lateral wells, but this is a function that 
could be implemented with the next version of WellView (v 9.0) which supports these types 
of wells. 
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Wellbarrier.com – Interactive web illustration tool 
The Norwegian company, Wellbarrier, offers a commercially available tool for creating WBS 
on their webpage; www.wellbarrier.com (Wellbarrier, 2012). The tool displays the well with 
barriers in blue and red, indicating primary and secondary barriers, and a list of elements with 
related tests and is customizable to suit the users need, such as company logo or other 
specific needs. 
 
Well configuration can be chosen from a library containing more than 170 illustrations 
(Figure 17) which can visualize wells in the construction, operation and maintenance phase 
and is also in line with the NORSOK D-010 Standard. A link between the barrier element and 
the relevant NORSOK D-010 acceptance criteria is available. 
 
 
Figure 17: Well configurations on the Wellbarrier tool (Wellbarrier, 2012) 
 
 
 
 Barriers in a wider perspective 
 
45 
 
The user can also create the well configuration by “constructing” the well manually, as seen 
in Figure 18 to if the template is not satisfactory or the well is a special case. 
 
 
Figure 18: Manually creating the well configuration and barriers (Wellbarrier, 2012) 
 
Barrier elements can be modified, such as cement height, BOP configuration or annotations, 
before finally printing out the schematic as a PDF-file. 
 
Wellbarrier is a powerful online-tool which is easy to use and require little training. It is very 
versatile as it can be used for almost very well configuration. 
The direct link between the barrier elements and the well barrier acceptance table in 
NORSOK D-010 is a clever way to inform users of different requirements. 
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The data entered in this tool is however not connected to any company database, and the data 
is therefore required to be duplicated. This is a potential source of error, as all the data has to 
be put in manually. Also, the well configuration has to be chosen beforehand or created 
manually, which requires some work to be done. 
Another downside with this is that the data within the schematic is not updated when the data 
or database is updated, and will require continuously revisions. 
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WellMaster – by Exprosoft 
 
WellMaster, by Exprosoft, is a program used for storing, analyzing and reporting well data, 
and is mainly used to point out any failures in the completion equipment (Exprosoft, 2011) 
(Figure 19). It can however be linked to other databases, such as WellView, and display 
completion schematics stored in WellView for any particular well.  
 
 
Figure 19: Completion equipment in WellMaster (ExproSoft, 2012) 
 
At the moment, a well barrier schematic option within WellMaster is under development, by 
request from StatoilHydro. Little information is available about the design and functionality 
of this well barrier schematic program, Figure 20 show however the preliminary status of the 
WBS development and by the looks of it, it seems to have a very similar design to what is 
currently in NORSOK D-010 standard. 
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From Exprosofts webpage, the following information is available (ExproSoft, 2012); 
 
“The work has included collection and review of relevant data for establishing the necessary 
well barrier diagrams (WBS) for all Statoil operated wells on the NCS after the merger with 
Norsk Hydro, and work out the actual diagrams for each individual well (two diagrams per 
well; As run status, and Monitoring) based on the requirements given in NORSOK D-010 and 
on detailed additional WBS template requirements set up by Statoil. In all, over 1100 wells 
have been covered in the project, which was concluded mid March 2010.” 
 
 
 
 
Figure 20: Well barrier schematic function within WellMaster (Exprosoft, 2012) 
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3.3 ACTIVE BARRIERS 
 
Active barriers are systems or procedures in place that could act as barriers given they are 
activated or performed. These include amongst other, surveillance, monitoring and alarms. 
 
3.3.1 Shutdown systems 
Shutdown systems are safety measures in place to handle incidents like influx, loss of 
hydraulic pressure, prevent gas from igniting etc. Shutdown systems can be automatically or 
manually activated and are present in different phases of the wells life, on the BOP during 
drilling and well service, and on the X-mas tree during production.  
 
3.3.2 Alarms 
Alarms can give an early indication of abnormalities, and sudden changes occurring during 
well operations and alert the well personnel at an early stage, if they are activated. Gas 
detection, loss of hydraulic pressure or increase in wellhead pressures can be detected before 
the shutdown system kicks in and give the personnel the opportunity to take preventive 
measures before an eventual incident occurs. 
Alarms can also be added as per well basis and moves the well control from a reactive 
measure to a proactive measure. 
 
3.3.3 Verification of barriers 
According to both NORSOK D-010 and the Norwegian regulations, any WBE has to be 
verified and tested in order to be classified as a well barrier. 
It is therefore important that any WBE is tested or verified according to guidelines and that 
preventive maintenance and testing is done on equipment regularly to ensure the integrity. It 
is also important that the operational pressure does not exceed what the relevant WBE has 
been tested for, as it will no longer be an accepted WBE above this pressure. 
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An example of an important verification which is often left out is verification of the casing 
cement. When plugging and abandoning a well, the barriers consist of the cement plug in the 
wellbore as well as the previous set, casing cement. In most cases, operators do not run a 
cement bonding log (CBL) to verify the quality of the casing cement in the construction 
phase of the well. This leads to uncertainty of the barrier integrity in the P&A phase as the 
presence of good cement all the way out to formation is unknown. 
Running a CBL after casing cement might increase the cost of the well slightly, but is far 
cheaper than having to mill/underream the well later on in order to achieve good cement 
bonding to formation. 
 
3.3.4 Pressure/temperature/flow surveillance 
Pressure, temperature and flow monitoring in wells can provide information regarding the 
wells integrity and help determine if the barriers are intact or not.  
Pressure build-ups in the annulus can occur as a result of poor cement sealing or movement 
of the casing string due to thermal expansion. This could lead to migration of oil and gas 
outside the casing, increasing the annulus pressure and in worst case, losing the casing 
integrity. 
 
Wireless Pressure Monitoring 
For land wells and offshore wells with dry wellheads, accessing the different annuli is easy 
and provides the user with vital information and access to make any needed adjustments. 
In subsea wells, monitoring the B-annulus is challenging as the access is closed off after 
landing the casing hanger, sealing and casing cement. This is because, according to ISO 
13628-4 and API17D, the primary barrier of subsea wells should never be breached (Sultan, 
et al., 2008). 
 
Emerson Process Management has recently (2012) developed a tool for monitoring annulus B 
in subsea wells, by using a new wireless pressure sensor system, called, Roxar Downhole 
Wireless PT Sensor System. This wireless system can provide feedback regarding the 
pressure and temperature of the annulus, and the barriers containing well pressure from the 
annulus. The system can accurately read pressure of +/- 2.5 psi and temperatures to +/- 0.18 
ºF (Thomas, 2011). 
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This new tool could, according to Emerson, provide cost savings because of the over 
dimensioning of casings that usually takes place to compensate for worst case scenarios. With 
the added integrity certainty that comes with the permanent annulus monitoring, this could be 
avoided. Integrity issues could also cause the well to be shut in early, leading to loss of 
income. The wireless pressure system could also help the engineers with troubleshooting of 
the wells integrity if any non-conformances occur.  
 
The lifespan of this monitoring equipment is qualified to be 20 years minimum, and are able 
to withstand pressure up to 10 000 psi and temperatures of 150 ºC. 
 
A similar product is also offered by Sensor Developments in cooperation with Statoil, called 
LinX Annular (Sensor Development, 2012). This is probably something the industry will see 
more of the coming years, as the technology progresses.
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Chapter 4. Physical Well Barriers  
 
4.1 BARRIER ENVELOPES 
 
The purpose of well barriers is to maintain well control and to prevent unwanted flow of 
formation fluids to surface or other formations. NORSOK Standard D-010 use the following 
definition of well barriers; “Well barriers are envelopes of one or several dependent WBEs 
preventing fluids or gases from flowing unintentionally from the formation, into another 
formation or to surface.” (NORSOK Standard D-010, 2004) 
In this context, well barriers mean physical equipment in the well, acting as barriers. 
 
As defined in the NORSOK D-010 Standard, a well barrier consist of one or more well 
barrier elements, which on their own are not qualified as a well barrier. 
The well barrier elements (WBE) are physical objects that form a continuous envelope 
around the wellbore, enclosing the well and ensuring its integrity. As a well barrier is only as 
good as its weakest barrier element, it is therefore imperative that the WBE(s) meet the 
required standards and can withstand the pressure exerted by the well. This is because if a 
leak or failure occurs in a WBE, there should always be a backup barrier to ensure that there 
is no leakage or spills to surface. 
 
According to Norwegian regulations (Ptil, 2012) and the NORSOK D-010 standard 
(NORSOK Standard D-010, 2004), the well should have at least two tested and verified 
independent well barriers during all drilling and well activities. 
These barriers are called primary and secondary barriers and should to the extent possible not 
have any common WBE(s) between them. If a common WBE is present, a risk analysis 
should be performed and mitigating measures applied. 
If one of these barriers is breached, all well activities except trying to restore the well barrier 
should be stopped. 
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One of the biggest challenges is the requirements for permanent well barriers to have long-
term integrity properties. However, no descriptions of how to perform long term integrity test 
is found in NORSOK D-010 or in any ISO/API standards. As a result, the industry does not 
perform long term integrity tests on WBE(s) (Vignes, 2012). 
 
4.1.1 Primary barriers 
The first barrier envelope, usually drawn in blue on Well Barrier Schematics, is called the 
primary barrier. This is the innermost barrier which will be the first obstacle that prevents 
unwanted flow of formation fluid.  
 
 
Figure 21: Primary barriers for drilling, operation, and P&A well [Based on (NORSOK Standard D-010, 
2004)] 
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The different operational phases of the well use different types of primary barriers. 
 
During drilling, the mud column acts as the primary barrier. Although this is a single well 
barrier element it is classified as a complete well barrier envelope. 
While producing, the tubing string, together with valves, packers, casing and cement makes 
up the primary barrier. For permanent plug and abandonment, the cement plug and casing 
cement isolating the reservoir makes up the primary barrier. 
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4.1.2 Secondary barriers 
The secondary barrier envelope, usually drawn in red on Well Barrier Schematics, is located 
outside the primary barrier envelope, and acts as the backup barrier. While not in direct 
contact with the formation fluid, is shall be capable of handling the well pressures if integrity 
of the primary well barrier is lost. 
 
 
Figure 22: Secondary barriers for drilling, operation, and P&A well [Based on (NORSOK Standard D-
010, 2004)] 
 
During drilling, the BOP together with casing strings and casing cement makes up the 
secondary barrier. While producing, the wellhead, X-mas tree, casing strings and casing 
cement make up the secondary barrier. 
For permanent plug and abandonment, a second plug above the primary reservoir plug with 
related casing cement makes up the secondary barrier.  
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4.2 WELL BARRIER ELEMENT DESIGN CRITERIA 
 
Design criteria for well barrier elements can be found in NORSOK D-010 and states that the 
well barrier should be selected and constructed so that (NORSOK Standard D-010, 2004): 
 
 It can withstand the maximum anticipated differential pressure it may become 
exposed to. 
 It can be leak tested and function tested or verified by other methods 
 No single failure of well barrier or WBE leads to uncontrolled outflow from the 
borehole / well to the external environment. 
 Re-establishment of a lost well barrier or another alternative well barrier can be 
done. 
 It can operate competently and withstand the environment for which it may be 
exposed to over time. 
 Its physical location and integrity status of the well barrier is known at all times when 
such monitoring is possible. 
 
The well integrity and physical position of the well barrier elements should be known at all 
times, and should be monitored whenever possible.  
In order to ensure the quality of the WBEs, testing procedures and operational requirements 
are described in the NORSOK D-010. 
NORSOK D-010 Standard, Chapter 15 contains 50 acceptance tables for the various WBE(s), 
with provided description for the functionality of the barrier element, the design criteria, how 
to perform initial testing and verification, proper use and monitoring and any potential failure 
modes. These are based on API standards, ISO standards and NORSOK standards.  
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4.3 WELL BARRIER ELEMENTS AND RELATED              
CHALLENGES 
 
Well barrier elements (WBE) make up the well barrier envelopes and represent the physical 
barriers in the well. All the barrier elements have to be tested or verified before they can be 
classified as a barrier element. Some WBE‟s are used in the entire life of the well, like casing 
and cement, while others are more situational like drilling mud and tubing string. 
For a component to be a permanent well barrier element, as required in permanent P&A 
wells, it is required that it inhabits long term integrity properties. This is however a challenge 
as no guidance is given in NORSOK D-010 for how to perform long term integrity testing, 
and no one knows for sure how materials behave at reservoir conditions over a long period.  
 
Today, most of the tools and equipment have not been tested for long term integrity, but are 
still being used as permanent well barrier elements in active wells. 
Some new products being offered, like the new isolation materials ThermaSet and Sandaband 
are said to inhabit these long term integrity properties, but the industry have not yet fully 
embraced these materials. 
 
4.3.1 Blowout preventer 
A blowout preventer (BOP) is a type of equipment installed on the wellhead and is primarily 
used to contain the pressures in the well in order to avoid kicks and blowouts, and to control 
& monitor the well. The BOP also prevents casing, tubing, tools and well fluids from being 
blow out of the wellbore and is therefore a critical well barrier element regarding the safety of 
the rig and the crew. The BOP is most often a secondary well barrier in the well. 
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Figure 23: A typical BOP-stack [Based on (AskChesapeake, 2012)] 
 
Different types of BOP‟s exist, with various sizes, configurations and pressure ratings. 
The type of BOP used is based on which operational phase the well is in; drilling, 
completion, testing or workover, the characteristics of the well, and whether if it‟s an 
onshore/offshore/subsea well. 
 
The BOP contains several rams which serves different functions. 
In the case of a kick, the BOP has the ability to contain it, by sealing the annulus around the 
drill pipe with a pipe-ram, before initiating well kill procedures. 
Alternatively this can be done by the use of an Annular Blowout preventer, a donut like 
rubber seal, which can seal around various pipe sizes. 
If needed, the BOP can also cut the drill string, coiled tubing (CT) or wire line (WL), and seal 
the entire wellbore, with a blind shear ram. 
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The BOP can be controlled by hydraulic pressure from remote accumulators or manually if 
the well is an onshore well or drilled in shallow waters, where the BOP and wellhead is above 
the water. 
For deeper offshore wells, there are four main ways to control the BOP; 
1. Electrical signal through cable from surface. 
2. Acoustic signal sent from surface. 
3. ROV intervention, mechanically control valves 
4. Deadman Switch, automatic shearing in case of loss of control, power or hydraulic 
pressure. 
 
According to Norwegian regulations, and extra casing shear ram is required, while the US 
regulations does not require any (Det Norske Veritas, 2010). It is also, by Norwegian 
regulations, required that there exist an alternatively activation system for the BOP and a 
system that detaches from the riser before it reaches a critical angel. In the US, no such 
requirements are in place.   
 
Since the BOP is such an important well barrier element, they are regularly inspected and 
tested. According to API 16A and ISO 13533 standards, the parts of the BOP containing and 
controlling pressures should be tested and qualified by being exposed to the wellbore fluid. It 
is a normal industry assumption that the wellbore fluid does not include gas, and so the 
pressure containing parts of the BOP are not exposed, tested or qualified with gas. 
The ram type BOP is according to API 16A/ISO 13533 (ISO 13533, 2002), tested for the 
sealing characteristics, fatigue test, stripping life test, shear ram test, hang-off test, ram access 
test and ram locking device test for ram type BOP‟s. while for annular type BOP‟s, it is tested 
for its sealing characteristics, fatigue test, packer access test, stripping life test, locking 
mechanism for hydraulic connectors and sealing mechanism for hydraulic connectors 
(Vignes, 2012). 
Long term integrity testing is at the present time not defined in any of the API, ISO or 
NORSOK standards. The BOP is however only installed for a relative short amount of time, 
and most likely does not require long term integrity. 
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4.3.2 Casing 
While drilling, steel tubular (casing strings) are run in hole in order to protect the formation 
as the weight of drilling mud increases to compensate for the high pore pressure. 
There are several factors regarding the casing string that can affect well integrity; 
 
Casing connections 
One of the most important key factors to casing integrity is the casing connections and the 
process of handling, make-up, testing and qualification of these, as well as the compound 
used in the connections threads. 
 
According to studies (Schwind, 1998), estimates show that 85 to 95% of all failures related to 
tubular are related to connections. These are often neglected are given little attention when 
designing tubular, possibly from a lack of understanding of the connection importance. One 
of the main reasons for the connection failures is the fact the connections experience the same 
loads as the tubular itself, but is often weaker in tension, compression, pressure or bending 
(Aadnøy, et al., 2009). If only one casing connections is leaking, it could compromise the 
entire string, and disqualify the casing as a barrier.  
  
The two major types of connections used in the oil industry today are proprietary and API 
connections. The proprietary, also known as premium connections, and are designed and 
manufactured by commercial manufactures with capability of handling greater depths with 
higher pressures and temperatures and have higher capacities than API connections. The 
price for the premium connections, range from two to five times the cost of API connections. 
The API connections are designed in accordance with tolerances specified by API, and were 
intended to standardize pipe sizes and connections to favor interchangeability. 
The problem with the specifications in the API standard is that there is a certain tolerance 
allowed with regards to size to the pin and box connections. 
 
Example from the industry;  
ConocoPhillips once ordered a CTC (Completion Tool Company) packer joint which was to 
be delivered from the US (Blaauw, 2012). The buttress and coupled (BTC) connections used, 
tested OK in the lab in the US, but as it was run in hole in the well in Norway, the joint 
started to leak. 
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It was tested again in the lab in US, indicating no problem. After several rounds of this, back 
and forth it was finally decided to test the joint at Weatherford in Norway.  
The test concluded with that the joint was leaking.  
The reason for the inconsistency proved to be the tolerances stated in the API standard. The 
connections used in the Norwegian testing lab, and in the well, was at the one side of the 
allowed tolerance spectrum, while the ones used in the US was from the opposite side of the 
spectrum. This tolerance was enough to allow the join to leak at the connections.  
 
Another consideration regarding the API connections is the need for a compound to seal the 
leak path in the connections. The compound deteriorates over time and at high temperatures 
and loses its sealing properties. At temperatures of 121˚C the compound will even start to 
evaporate, dry out and shrink, making the connection more likely to leak (Aadnøy, et al., 
2009). The type of compound and quantity and where it should be applied, shall be specified 
by the connection manufacturer. The manufacturer shall also provide pictures showing the 
minimum and maximum thread compound. The same specifications shall be used for testing 
purposes. 
 
There are four levels of casing and tubing connection test classes (ISO 13679, 2006). 
These are called the Connection Application Level (CAL), and are sorted by the severity of 
their applications. The reason for testing the casing and tubing connections is to determine 
the galling tendencies, the mechanical properties and the sealing properties of the 
connections. 
 
CAL IV and CAL III for casing and tubing connections are accepted as well barrier elements. 
The CAL IV and CAL III tests, as well as the CAL II test, are conducted by using gas as 
medium. The CAL I test which uses liquid. 
 
Table 2 displays the testing requirements for these four types as defined in ISO 13679:2006 
standard; Procedures for testing casing and tubing connection. 
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Table 2: Connection Application Level (ISO 13679, 2006) 
CAL IV  Intended for production and injection tubing and casing for gas service 
 Connections exposed to cyclical test loads including internal pressure, 
external pressure, tension, compression and bending. 
 Exposure to extensive thermal and thermal/pressure-tension cycling 
incurring a cumulative exposure of about 50 h to gas at an elevated 
temperature of 180˚C and pressure. 
 Limit load tests to failure conducted in all four quadrant of the axial-
pressure load diagram. 
CAL III  Intended for producing and injection tubing and casing for gas and 
liquid service. 
 Connections exposed to cyclical tests loads including internal pressure, 
external pressure, tension and compression. Bending is an optional load 
for CAL III testing. 
 The test procedure for thermal and thermal/pressure-tension cycling 
incurring a cumulative exposure of 5 h to gas at an elevated temperature 
of 135˚C. 
 Limit load tests to failure conducted in all four quadrants of the axial-
pressure load diagram. 
CAL II  Intended for production and injection tubing and casing, protective 
casing and for gas and liquid service with limited exposure to significant 
pressure. 
 Connections exposed to cyclical test loads including internal pressure, 
tension and compression. Bending is an optional load for CAL II testing 
and external pressure is not included. 
  The test procedure for thermal and thermal/pressure-tension cycling is 
the same as for CAL III. 
 Limit load tests for CAL II to failure are conducted with internal 
pressure and axial load. 
CAL I  Intended for liquid service. 
 Connections exposed to cyclical test loads, including internal pressure, 
tension and compression, using a liquid test fluid. Bending is optional of 
CAL I testing and external pressure is not included. 
 Testing is conducted at ambient temperatures. 
 Limit load tests are conducted in two quadrants of the axial-pressure 
load diagram. 
 
 
Make-up torques is an important aspect of casing and tubing connections. The recent years, 
drilling has become more aggressive and challenging, and by the use of top drives instead of 
rotary tables, higher torque output has been made available. If too little torque is applied, the 
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connection might not provide the required sealing properties. If too much is applied, it might 
break the threads.  
 
During operations, connections are often tightened above the recommended make-up torque 
in order to make sure the connections are tight. In 2005, a study was done to investigate the 
effect that increased make-up torque had on rotary shouldered connection performance 
(Breihan, et al., 2005). Sets of connections were tested for various bending stress levels at 
different torque values until failure or until 20 million cycles were reached. The study 
concluded that caution should be taken with regards to applying make-up torque above the 
API recommendations, as this had a negative effect on fatigue life.  
 
As stated in ISO 13679:2006 standard, the manufacturer shall specify the rotational 
frequency range for the make-up, as well as the maximum and minimum recommended 
torque. Casing and tubing connections are through testing, subjected to internal and external 
pressures, tensional and compression forces, bending and make-up torsion. 
To avoid compromising the integrity of casing and tubing connections, having requirements 
as opposed to recommendations regarding make-up torque, could prove beneficial. 
  
Exposure to corrosive fluids that might be present during well services is however not a 
factor during connection tests. Long term integrity testing of casing connections is also not 
done and is not defined in any standard. 
  
One of the challenges the industry have today is that many wells are using casing and tubing 
connections that are not qualified for gas, despite the fact that these are being used or can be 
used for gas-lift or otherwise being exposed to gas. This could be result of inadequate well 
design or lack of available gas tight connections when the well was constructed. This may 
prove to be a problem on many of the two-string-design wells. 
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Corrosion / Erosion / Wear 
Degradation of the casing can lead to weak spots and allow for the possibility of bursted 
casing. With the increased exposure to acids, H2S and gas-lift gas used in wells, corrosion is 
an increasingly problem. The casings are as previously mentioned not tested for these types 
of fluids. 
 
For wells producing from sandstone reservoirs, erosion caused by sand-production is a big 
factor, but could be mitigated through means of sand packs. During drilling phase, contact 
between the rotating drill-string and the casing could cause tear at certain points which could 
lead to a reduction of the wall thickness and cause lower internal pressure ratings for the 
casing. 
 
Placement of casing shoes 
The setting depth of the casing shoe is a critical factor for maintaining the formations 
integrity during drilling, but they also play a role for well integrity during its production 
phase. 
A loss of circulation or a kick situation may lead to high burst or collapse loads on the casing 
string. Smart design of casing shoe placement is needed in order to prevent the casing from 
losing its integrity. 
The resulting burst load of the casing is the inside pressure minus the outside pressure. If a 
kick occurs, the casing might be filled with gas or very light fluid. The pressure inside the 
casing will at worst case be the reservoir pressure minus the hydrostatic pressure exerted by 
the fluid column. A gas or light fluid will not provide a lot of pressure, especially at the top. 
The weak point will therefore be at the wellhead.  
It is important to design the well so that if a weak point is present, it should be located below 
the casing shoe. This is an acceptable state of reduced well integrity (Aadnøy, 2010). 
A weak point at the wellhead could lead to a blowout and have disastrous consequences.  
 
During the production phase, the casing shoes should be able to withstand the reservoir 
pressure in order to qualify as a well barrier.  
If the primary barrier envelope is compromised, the secondary barrier envelope should be 
there as back-up. This presents a challenge in two-string design wells, where the 13” casing 
shoe, which is exposed to the A-annulus, normally don‟t have the required strength to 
withstand formation pressure, and can therefore not be qualified as a barrier element.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
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4.3.3 Well Isolation  
To ensure the integrity of the casing strings in the well, they are cemented to the formation. 
The cement not only keeps the casing strings in place, but holds the important function of 
isolating the wellbore between the formation and the casing in order to try to restore the 
initial sealing property which the formation previously had. With proper sealing, it also 
prevents influx from the reservoir or any shallow gas zones, into the annuli which could lead 
to sustained casing pressure or unwanted casing strains. This isolation is present as both a 
primary and a secondary barrier in the well; both during construction and operation phase, as 
a vertical barrier, and in the P&A phase, as both a vertical and a horizontal barrier. 
  
Different materials are also used for temporary plugging, either as the primary plugging 
material or in aiding additional plugging material. 
The importance of the isolation makes this a critical well barrier element which should be 
chosen, tested and verified to ensure long term integrity. 
Listed below are some of the challenges related to well isolation as well as a discussion 
regarding isolation solutions available on the market. 
 
Sustained Casing Pressure 
Sustained casing pressure (SCP) is a major challenge on several wells, and has been given 
more attention the recent years, as incidents caused by SCP are reported by operators 
(Wojtanowicz, 2001). Sustained casing pressure means that the pressure in any annuli 
rebuilds after being bled down, and is not caused solely by temperature fluctuations or 
imposed by the operator. In most cases the SCP is manageable by the casing strength and 
does not pose any big issue, but in some cases there is a risk of hydrocarbon leak to surface, 
causing pollution to sea or aquifers. This makes these wells risky to produce from, and should 
have their excessive casing pressure eliminated before P&A take place. 
 
SCP is mainly caused by migrating gas through the casing cement as a result of poor cement 
job, so having a good quality of the cement job is crucial. The gas causing SCP could also 
seep through the formation, meaning placement of the casing shoe should also be taken into 
account and be set in a strong enough formation. Other possible causes of SCP include defect 
and leaking equipment/seals due to corrosion, erosion or temperature/pressure fluctuations or 
other well integrity failures.  
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SCP can occur anytime in the wells lifecycle and will manifest itself at the wellhead. For 
subsurface wells this presents a real challenge as casing pressure monitoring is unavailable in 
many wells. Emersons, Roxar Downhole Wireless PT Sensor System, as mentioned 
previously, or similar solutions, could solve this issue. 
 
 
Figure 24: Potential leaks paths resulting in SCP [Based on (Sæby, 2011)] 
 
Figure 24 shows an example of how SCP can occur in a well. Gas can migrate through micro-
annuli in the cement, through improper cement-formation bonds, through the formation or 
through leaking seals and faulty equipment. Arrows indicate possible migration paths. 
 
BOEM and BSEE, formerly known as MMS, have in their regulations, a have a zero 
tolerance of SCP. Waivers can however be granted to allow operation on wells with small 
SCP problems, based on casing pressure diagnostic tests. 
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In Gulf of Mexico (GOM) there are believed to be over 8000 wells with SCP and present a 
major challenge with regards to keeping well integrity (Wojtanowicz, 2001). No data with 
regards to SCP has yet to be presented for wells on the NCS, making the magnitude of this 
issue unknown (Lunde, 2012) (Sæby, 2011). 
 
According to NORSOK D-010, the pressure in the A annulus shall be monitored and 
maintained at all times (NORSOK Standard D-010, 2004). In gas-lifted and multipurpose 
wells, the B-annulus pressure shall also be continuous monitored. Because of the challenge of 
monitoring pressure in subsurface wells, the B-annulus is normally designed to withstand the 
thermal pressure build up or have an acceptable pressure management system. 
 
The API RP-90 standard state that if an annulus casing pressure is below 100 psi, it presents 
little risk and monitoring the pressure is sufficient. If the pressure is greater than 100 psi and 
the casing annulus has been diagnosed with SCP, it has to be bled down to 0 psi. Annulus 
pressure which does not meet these requirements should be judged on a case-by-case basis by 
the use of risk assessments (API RP 90, 2006). 
 
Requirements and guidelines about management of SCP were in the past very limited, and 
with the increasing attention on SCP, it became clear that a set of guidelines had to be made 
in order for operators to approach the issue in a more consistent way. In 2010, WIF made a 
plan to update the well integrity guideline document, OLF 117, to include a chapter about 
recommendations and best practices regarding SCP. 
A dedicated group with representatives from BP, ConocoPhillips, Shell and Statoil worked 
together and in May 2011 the SCP guideline were completed (Sæby, 2011). 
The guideline describes SCP management protocols, for both platform and subsea wells, with 
regards to monitoring, detection, evaluation, acceptance criteria and mitigating measures. It 
also describes design of new wells and intervention in existing wells with regards to prevent 
and eliminate SCP. 
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Cement 
Cement has been the used isolation material in wells, since the beginning of the oil industry. 
The knowledge and experience by using cement is therefore extensive, and a more optimal 
material has yet to be found. Although new solutions and materials are being offered, one of 
the big challenges is that the petroleum industry is often very hesitant to use them and rely 
very much on the cement. Compared to various other isolation material introduced in recent 
times, like ThermaSet and Sandaband, cement is still cheaper, more accessible and more 
trusted, which may be some of the reasons why it is still preferred. 
 
Previously, the companies performing the cement job worked by the motto;  
“Mix it grey, pump it away!” The importance of a good quality cement job with regards to 
well integrity was not well known, a challenge the industry has to face today with many of 
the old wells being affected by inadequate cement jobs.  
 
Today however, more care is carried out with regards to cement quality, density 
measurements, volume control, testing and monitoring. A good cement job is crucial for the 
wells integrity, and can provide major obstacles down the line if not done correctly. Cement 
integrity issues like micro annuli and improper formation bonding can be difficult or 
impossible to mend and can turn out to be a costly affair.  
 
The main challenges today which affect the cement integrity include hole cleaning, 
circulation of cement, centralization of casings, setting time of the cement, logging, testing 
and verification (Vignes, 2012). 
 
Before pumping of the cement commence, is it important that the well has been cleaned 
properly as swarf and other remains could cause major increase to pump pressure due to 
frictional forces. This increased pressure could cause difficulties lifting the cement or in 
worst case fracture the formation if the well is drilled with small margins to the fracture 
gradient.  
Another factor important to consider in the planning phase of the cement job, is the use of 
acid treatments planned for the well. The corrosive environment could affect the cement 
quality over time, and should be mitigated by ensuring that there is a sufficient length of 
unaffected cement to compensate for the poor. 
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Running cement logs to verify the quality of the cement is however not normal procedure as 
per date, but could uncover challenges like cement centralization, bonding, contamination, 
channeling and micro annulus. These are issues that could cause sustained casing pressure or 
render the cement useless as a barrier.  
Improper casing centralization, as seen in Figure 25, could lead to reduced cement integrity 
due to the reduced thickness of the cement. 
 
 
Figure 25: Bad casing centralization (WellCem, 2012) 
  
For a well which is being permanent plugged and abandoned, the casing, casing cement, and 
cement plugs in the well are meant to ensure full well integrity for an infinite amount of time. 
Age and stress tests have been conducted on cement plugs, but these tests are limited and no 
one knows for sure how the cement plugs will hold up after thousands of years. It is a fact 
that the cement does not fulfill the long term integrity requirements that a permanent WBE 
shall have according to NORSOK D-010. 
 
The lack of long term integrity testing and properties of permanent well barriers is one of the 
big challenges in the industry today. On new isolation materials like ThermaSet and 
Sandaband, which are discussed later, long term integrity tests are performed. The industry 
still relies mostly on cement as their primary isolation material, even though it does not fulfill 
the permanent isolation requirements. The integration of the new isolation materials might be 
a long and slow process, but could eliminate challenges the industry has with regards to long 
term integrity. 
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Packers and Bridge Plugs 
Packers and plugs are tools set to isolate a part of the wellbore and can be both permanent 
and temporary In order to ensure integrity of these tools, an international standard of design 
validation grades have been made in order to categorize the different packers and plugs. 
These grades vary from V6-V0, with V0 as the most secure, and provide the user with a 
choice of requirements or specific application that the plugs should be applicable for. Bridge 
plugs may be tested and run without axial load. 
 
V6:  Supplier/manufacturer-defined 
V5:  Liquid test 
V4:  Liquid test + axial loads 
V3:  Liquid test + axial loads + temperature cycling 
V2:  Gas test + axial loads 
V1:  Gas test + axial loads + temperature cycling 
V0:  Gas test + axial loads + temperature cycling + special acceptance criteria 
(V1 + zero bubble acceptance criteria) 
 
Testing procedure is specified in ISO 14310 and verification and periodical testing are 
specified in NORSOK D-010. No long term integrity testing is however defined in these 
standards. 
 
The challenge in the industry today is the packers and plugs which are not qualified as being 
gas-tight (V3-V6) and the use of these where they might be exposed to gas medium. The 
wells which currently use these packers and plugs as a part of their barrier envelope may be 
under a false sense of security.   
  
Barite Plugs 
A barite plug is a slurry mix made up of barite, complex phosphate thinner and water, 
preferably fresh water. This is pumped down the drill pipe and set in the bottom of the well to 
form an immovable sealing column. Its main purpose is to initially, kill the well, and 
secondly, form a mechanically block as the barite is settling (Messenger, 1981) (MI Swaco, 
2012) (ConocoPhillips, 1997).  
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Normally, barite plugs are used in emergencies or in extreme conditions where it is important 
to seal the wellbore. An example of such a situation could be when encountering a kick. 
Normal procedure would be to build up the mud weight to control the kick, however, 
sometimes a situation arise where both kicking and loss of circulation occur at the same time 
or in worst case, an underground blowout. This is a very dangerous situation, and placing a 
plug in order to run in a casing safely is desirable. 
This is one of the main uses for barite plugs. 
 
Some situations where barite plugs are applicable (ConocoPhillips, 1997); 
 Kicking from lower zone and losing circulation to an upper zone 
 Abandonment procedure allowing safe withdrawal of dill pipe to allow setting of 
cement plug 
 Withdrawal of drill pipe to either set casing or repair existing casing strings 
 Plugging drill pipe in emergency situations 
 High pressure salt water flows where required kill mud weight approaches or exceeds 
the formation breakdown equivalent at some point in the open hole, usually last 
casing string 
 
Killing the well with a barite plug is straightforward and only requires that enough slurry is 
pumped down the well for the bottom-hole pressure to exceed the reservoir pressure. Issue 
arise however if the reservoir pressure is unknown, or if the formation cannot withstand the 
amount of slurry required.  
The relief well used to kill Sagas 2/4-14 underground blowout is an example of a successful 
well-kill using barite plug. This is discussed later on in Chapter 6.   
 
Ensuring a mechanical block is made is more challenging. The general method consists of 
making a slurry where the barite starts to settle particles into a firm plug. Settling rate is often 
easy to predict as it is independent of the slurry height, allowing small scale tests to be done 
beforehand. In oil based mud (OBM), the settling rate is affected by factors such as 
density/concentration of weight material and concentration of oil-wetting agents. 
Another way to form a solid plug is through dehydration, caused by the barite plugs high 
filter loss.  
 
 Physical Well Barriers 
 
73 
 
Tests conducted show that densities of 2.04-2.16 s.g. mud provides optimum conditions for 
settling rates, while higher density mud will lead to a significantly reduction in settling rates. 
This is due to the fact that as the amount of solids in the mud increase, the mud is 
transformed from a liquid to a plastic state, resulting in high viscosities. The density where 
this occurs is known as the packing fraction. 
For lower densities, the reduction of weighting agent concentrations will lead to reduced 
settling rates. To avoid movement or migration of the plug after it has been set, a density of 
0.06-0.12 s.g. higher than the fluid in the hole is desirable. 
    
The initial settling rate is constant, but only last a short time. As more and more particles fall 
out of suspension, the settling rate decreases. Having an optimum settling rate is important in 
terms of having a successful plugging operation. The length of the required compacted barite 
plug varies based on the severity of the situation, and to calculate the length of the compacted 
plug, the following formula is used (MI Swaco, 2012); 
 
L = m / (sg x V) 
where, 
L = Length of compacted plug (m) 
m = Kgs of barite (kg) 
sg = Specific gravity if barite (4.2 kg/ltr) 
V = Volume per meter of hole (ltr/m)  
 
The total length of the slurry should not exceed the distance between the kicking zone and the 
loss circulation zone. This is to avoid losing slurry to the formation, and also to avoid having 
to withdraw the drill string a great distance. If the formation pressure is known, the required 
length of slurry to balance the pressure can be calculated.  
 
While displacing the slurry, having 1 m³ more inside the drill pipe than outside is desirable, 
in order to allow the drill pipe to be withdrawn with a natural slug, and also to minimize 
contamination caused by movement of the slurry. 
Once the plug has been set, tripping should be done as soon as possible and the plug should 
be allowed to settle for several hours. When the plug has been set, a cement plug can be set 
on top to secure the well safely. 
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ThermaSet 
ThermaSet, a resin based sealant made by WellCem is one of the alternative isolation 
materials available. The development of ThermasSet started in 1990 through the research 
group, SINTEF. Studies of several materials where conducted in order to investigate the 
endurance, and sustainability of the materials, under well conditions. A thermosetting 
material, later called ThermaSet was chosen as the best solution (WellCem, 2012). 
 
ThermaSet can be designed so that it remains in liquid form until it reaches a certain 
temperature. This provides opportunities to pump the material through narrow channels 
before the material solidifies. It can be designed within a range of different densities and 
viscosities, and once it‟s set, it will remain viable for up to 500°C. The fact that the setting 
temperature along with viscosity and density can be regulated makes this a very unique 
product.  The setting temperature, for when the material starts to solidify, can be within the 
range of -9°C to 135°C. 
 
Some of the applications for this material include curing loss of circulation, permanent and 
balanced plugs, sealing of micro channels, zone isolation, and fast setting kick off plug which 
can be pumped through the drill bit. 
An ageing test was performed at SINTEF. Results from the ageing test displayed in Table 3: 
 
Table 3: Properties of ThermaSet vs. Standard Cement 
Properties ThermaSet Portland G Cement 
Compressive Strength (MPa) 77 ± 5 58 ± 4 
Flexural Strength (MPa) 45 ± 3 10 ± 1 
E-modulus (MPa) 2240 ± 70 3700 ± 600 
Rupture Elongation (%) 3.5 0.01 
Tensile Strength (MPa) 60 1 
Failure flexural strain (%) 1.9 ± 0.2 0.32 ± 0.04 
 
The results show that ThermaSet exhibits a far higher tensile strength than Portland G 
cement. It also shows a superior flexural strain and elasticity. A low tensile strength could 
cause the material to fracture as a result of casing expansion caused by heat flow from the 
producing fluid, especially when combined with a low rupture elongation. Cement is inferior 
to ThermaSet on these areas and could cause fracture problems, as seen on Table 3. 
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ThermaSet has also been V3 tested successfully, which is a liquid penetration test conducted 
by subjecting a sample to axial loads and temperature cycles. This has yet to be accomplished 
by traditional cement. 
Based on these studies, ThermaSet is claimed to be the only product that fully comply with 
NORSOK D-010 standard as a permanent well barrier material (WellCem, 2012). 
 
There have been a lot of documented cases when ThermaSet has been used successfully. 
 
ThermaSet Case Study – Ekofisk C-19 
When ConocoPhillips were to P&A 2/4 C-19 on Ekofisk, they used a cement plug as 
plugging material (WellCem, 2012). After the setting time, the plug was tested as per 
procedure but yielded a negative result. A leak in the cement plug inside the tubing was the 
cause. 
 
They decided to go for a ThermaSet plug, and a batch of 1.1sg density ThermaPlug was 
selected to match the existing well fluid. The plug was designed to solidify after one hour in 
an 80ºC environment, and was placed on top of the cement plug. As a result the tubing was 
plugged and the leak in the cement plug was mended. The plug was then tested to 4000 psi, 
and the P&A operation were continued.  
 
From this study, the use of ThermaSet proves beneficial as an isolation material. Here, 
ThermaSet was used as a plug. It is also, according to WellCem, possible to use ThermaSet 
for casing cementing, however, no case studies are available regarding this yet.  
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Sandaband 
Sandaband is a sand-slurry consisting of about three quarters sand particles and one quarter 
water and other additives (Sandaband, 2006) (Sandaband, 2012) (Sandaband, 2012). The 
product was developed in Norway to meet the increasing demands of an everlasting plugging 
material. Sandaband possesses the properties as a Bingham fluid (Figure 26) and act as a 
deformable solid when it‟s stationary, but as a liquid when in motion.  
 
 
 
Figure 26: Characteristics of a Bingham fluid [Based on (Schlumberger, 2012)] 
 
The sand slurry is also incompressible and gas tight, and does not shrink, fracture or 
segregate. It does however require a solid foundation, as it will sink if placed on another 
fluid. The Sandaband mixture can be used as both temporary and permanent plugging 
material, as fill behind the casing or as loss circulation material (LCM). 
NORSOK D-010 has requirements regarding permanent P&A plugs which say that a 
permanent well barrier should have the following properties:  
a) Impermeable. 
b) Long term integrity. 
c) Non-shrinking. 
d) Ductile – able to withstand mechanical loads/impact. 
e) Resistance to different chemicals/substances (H2S, CO2 and hydrocarbons). 
f) Wetting, to ensure bonding to steel 
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Sandaband claims to cover these criteria, 
 
a) It is claimed to be gas tight in accordance with API spec10 (Vignes, 2012), based on the 
fact that in the solid state, the sand particles remain fixed because of the tight packing. This, 
combined with the low porosity, leads to a permeability of less than 0.1 mD. 
 
The API 10A standard describes testing of cement and cannot be directly comparable with 
testing of Sandaband,  
 
b) Based on the characteristics of the sand slurry and its properties, it is indicated to have 
long term integrity properties. A long term integrity test has also been performed where the 
product was tested from -10 ˚C to 250 ˚C (Vignes, 2012). 
 
c) The sand slurry is incompressible based on the fact that there is no chemical reaction 
between the solid particles and the liquid phase and is therefore non-shrinking. 
 
d) It acts as a Bingham fluid and is fluidized when subjected to a pressure above its yield 
point. This ductile behavior means that the sand slurry will never fracture or create micro 
annuli. 
 
e) The particles are mainly quartz, which is chemically stable even in contact with CO2, H2S 
or reservoir fluids. 
 
f) Sandaband exhibits wettability properties towards the casing. 
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Sandaband Case Study – Embla D-07 
ConocoPhillips introduced Sandaband in one of their wells, Embla D-07 as a mean to provide 
a temporary plug to secure the well (Sandaband, 2010).  
 
Embla D-07 was drilled in May 2005, but encountered a pressure build up in A-annulus and 
tubing, due to tubing-annulus communication, and was shut in, January 2006. 
The pressure built up to 4900 psi and was at the time being, the highest risked well in 
ConocoPhillips. Using a temporary plug was suggested, for later allow workover and re-use 
the well. Several products were evaluated, and a decision to use Sandaband was made. It was 
estimated to be the biggest and most complex Sandaband job performed to date.  
 
The results of a cost analysis for the project are presented below:  
 
Cost of the temporary abandonment using Sandaband: 
Total cost:    6.5 million NOK 
Estimated days:   7 days 
 
Cost of temporary abandonment using traditionally P&A: 
Total cost:   19 million NOK 
Estimated days:  30 days 
   
A leak detection tool (LDT) was run to identify the leak point.  
The production packer was found to be leaking, and as an attempt to temporary secure the 
well, two permanent bridge plugs was set in the reservoir liner, with 15 ft of HipMix cement 
dumped on top of the upper plug. The upper plug and cement was tested ok, however, 3-5 
months later the pressure started to build up again. 
 
The A-annulus still had a pressure of 4900 psi and was bleeding off oil. The cause was 
believed to be either a leak in the liner hanger or a leak in the plug & cement.  
 
A wire line set EOF (Baker Hughes internal grading) plug was placed in the tailpipe nipple. 
The EOF seating nipples are specifically designed for high pressure, high temperature 
(HPHT) wells (Baker Hughes, 2010). The Model V bottom check valve placed in this nipple 
allowed an upwards flow, but prevented a downwards flow. 
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Large holes were punched in the tubing, followed by displacing the tubing and annulus with 
inhibited seawater (ISW). The tubing was then cut above the production packer and 
Sandaband was pumped down the well, displaced by ISW. See Figure 27. 
 
 
 
Figure 27: Embla D-07 - After tubing has been cut – Circulating Sandaband [Based on (Sandaband, 
2010)] 
 
The inhibited seawater contributes with a hydrostatic pressure of 3820 psi, while the 
Sandaband contributed with a hydrostatic pressure of 4155 psi and a yield pressure of 4055 
psi. With a reservoir pressure of 10800 psi, this results in a positive overbalance pressure of 
1230 psi. By including a safety factor of 30%, a positive pressure of 294 psi is seen 
(Sandaband, 2010). See Appendix C for details. 
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The Sandaband job was performed with no downtime or HSE incidents and placed according 
to plan. The well is now currently ready for permanent P&A or for a workover. Figure 28 
shows the current well barrier schematic for Embla D-07. 
 
 
Figure 28: Well barrier Schematic of Embla D-07 – After Sandaband plug [Based on (ConocoPhillips, 
2012)] 
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The well pressure in Embla D-07 has been monitored since the setting of the Sandaband plug. 
Although the plug was set without complications, there is however, still a pressure build-up 
in the A-annulus, indicating that the Sandaband plug is not as impermeable as advertised. 
Figure 29 shows the pressure build in the well from 1
st
 January 2011 until present day. 
 
 
Figure 29: Wellhead pressure monitoring on Embla D-07 – 01.01.2011 – 28.02.2012 (ConocoPhillips, 
2012)  
 
The annulus pressure regularly builds up to around 1000 psi over a period of 6 months, 
before it is bled off. The pressure increase is around 3.75 psi/day. Based on this data, the 
Sandaband does not seem to be suited as a permanent P&A plug, as it does not fulfill the 
NORSOK D-010 requirements of being impermeable and having long term integrity. It can 
however be used as a temporary plug, as in this case, if monitored and maintained. 
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CannSeal 
AGR offers an epoxy-based solution to well isolation, called CannSeal, mainly intended for 
isolation of the annulus (AGR, 2009) (AGR, 2012) (Gunnarsson, 2011). The epoxy can be 
pumped into the annulus, by perforating the casing string, circulate and clean, and then set the 
CannSeal plug. The properties of the epoxy, such as setting temperature, elasticity and 
viscosity, can be tailored to suit the users need.  
Some of the applications of CannSeal include; 
 Seal off/reduce unwanted water and gas inflow behind liner/pip/screen. 
 Injected into a gravel matrix under high x-flow. 
 Seal off leaking packers. 
 Seal off annulus between two pipes. 
 Replace „spot on‟ cement squeeze. 
 Provide spot acidizing. 
 
The CannSeal tool have been tested and approved to temperatures up to 120 ˚C and pressure 
up to 345 bar, and is run in hole with a single wire line run.  
The development of the CannSeal technology started in 2005 and was supported by 
companies such as Demo2000, Statoil, Eni, Total and Shell. The final product was launched 
in 2010.  
 
 
Figure 30: Epoxy sealing material used with CannSeal (AGR, 2009) 
 
As of today however, CannSeal cannot promise a long term integrity barrier, and is therefore 
not suitable for permanent P&A (CannSeal, 2012). 
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Formation / Shale as annular barrier 
Sometimes when drilling through certain formations, the rock moves inward enclosing the 
well, and creates a barrier by sealing the annulus (Williams, et al., 2009). 
This is due to a reaction between the mud in the well and shale formations, making the shale 
swell. The following displacement mechanisms can be observed: 
 Shear or tensile failure 
 Compaction failure and / or consolidation 
 Liquefaction 
 Thermal expansion 
 Chemical effects 
 Creep 
 
During drilling and running casings, this is an unwanted effect that might cause issues. 
However, after the casing has been set, natural annulus barriers caused by shale swelling 
could reduce complex remedial work and substantial cost savings, by acting as an additional 
annular barrier. 
 
For the shale to be qualified as a barrier it must possess certain characteristics, such as a 
uniform displacement around the well and at a sufficient interval. It must also have sufficient 
rock strength and extremely low permeability to hinder any fluid from escaping. 
Qualification of these shale barriers has been done by bond logging and pressure testing and 
has shown that the shale has sealed off certain zones for over 40 wells by creating an annular 
barrier with good bonding. 
Observations supporting good formation bonding: 
 Good bond log response far above the theoretical top of cement 
 Good quality bond correlates with shale rich intervals 
 Large and sometimes frequent changes in bond long response at the same depth as 
geological changes. 
 Above the casing shoe of an outer casing string the log response changes from good 
quality bond to free pipe as the formation can no longer impinge onto the inner casing 
string. 
 Sinusoidal patterns on ultrasonic bond log images imply geological beds impinging 
on the outside of the casing 
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Prior to P&A jobs, it is important to make sure good quality cement is present on the outside 
of the casings where the plugs are placed. Methods of achieving this include perforate casing 
and squeezing cement, cutting and pulling casing followed by placing a long cement plug or 
section milling at least 50m of casing before placing a long cement plug. By using the natural 
shale as an outside isolation instead of cement, a substantial amount of work and money can 
be saved. 
 
In order for the shale to act as a permanent barrier element, the position of the displaced 
formation shall be identified and its seal ability verified.  
A methodology has been created for doing this: 
 Position and extent of collapsed formation shall be identified through appropriate 
logs. 
 Two (2) independent logging measurements/tools shall be applied. 
 Logging tools shall be suitable for applicable well conditions e.g. number of casing 
strings, casing dimensions and conditions, fluid types and densities. 
 Logging tools shall be properly calibrated. 
 Logs shall be interpreted by personnel with sufficient competence. 
 Log response criteria for good bonding shall be established prior to initiating the 
logging operations. 
 
To verify the formation as a barrier element both the log measurements/tools should show a 
continuous good bonding of minimum 50m. If the formation seal is less than 50m, a pressure 
test or inflow test should be conducted to verify. 
By using shale as an annular barrier instead of creating plugs for plug and abandonment, 
saves the company a great deal of time, money and effort due to reduction in rig time and 
operating costs. The shale barrier is also a self-healing, making it extremely durable and can 
prolong the well life and the quality of the well integrity. During 2007 and 2008, over 40 
P&A operations were conducted using formation as annular barrier with a success rate of 
over 90%. 
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4.3.4 Tubing / Completion String 
The tubing string is placed into the reservoir to produce the reservoir fluid and is in many 
ways similar to a casing string. Consequently, it shares a lot of the same challenges as a 
casing string does, including integrity of tubing connections, wear, tear, corrosion and erosion 
issues. The tubing string is acting as a primary barrier during production, so the well barrier 
elements related to the tubing is of high importance and requires full integrity. 
 
Safety Valve 
The subsurface safety valve (SSSV) also known as Downhole Safety Valve (DHSV) is 
defined by API 14A as a device whose design function is to prevent uncontrolled well flow 
when closed (API 14A, 2006). It can be installed and retrieved by wire-line, coiled tubing or 
as an integrated part of the tubing string.  
For the safety valve to be in accordance with the international standard, it has to conform to 
one of four classes of service; 
 
Class 1: Standard Service: 
This class of SSSV equipment is intended for use in wells which are not expected to 
exhibit detrimental effects defined by classes 2, 3 or 4. 
 
Class 2: Sandy Service 
This class of SSSV equipment is intended for use in wells which are where 
particulates such as sand could be expected to cause SSSV equipment failure. 
 
Class 3: Stress cracking service 
This class of SSSV is intended for use in wells where water containing corrosive 
agents can cause stress cracking and be manufactured from metallic materials that 
are demonstrated as resistant to sulfide stress cracking and stress corrosion cracking. 
 
Class 4: Mass loss corrosion service 
This class of SSSV equipment is intended for use in wells where the corrosive agents 
could be expected to cause mass loss corrosion and be manufactured from metallic 
materials that are resistant to mass loss corrosion. No national or international 
standard exists for the application of metallic materials for this class. 
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The safety valve has to be tested, according to NORSOK D-010, every month until three 
consecutive qualified tests have been performed. After this, the valve shall be tested every 
three months until three consecutive tests have been performed and finally every six months 
thereafter. 
Acceptance criteria are stated in API 14B, ISO 10417 and NORSOK D-010. 
No procedures for long term integrity testing are however described for this item. 
 
Gas Lift Valve 
The gas lift valve (GLV) is a valve used in the completion strings in wells on gas lift, in order 
to control the flow of gas-lift gas from the annulus into the tubing. As this provides direct 
communication between the annulus and tubing, it is a critical well barrier element. 
 
NORSOK D-010 Section 15, Table 29 defines the well barrier acceptance criteria for 
completion string components. It is stated: “For gaslift valves to qualify as a well barrier 
there shall be a qualification test demonstrating the valves ability to be gas tight over an 
operator defined number of cycles. The valve shall be subject to frequent testing with 
acceptable results similar to resting of SCSSVs.” 
 
The statement is somewhat contradicting and the SCSSVs are not gastight (Vignes, 2012). 
In addition, no specifications regarding leak testing of the GLV is described in NORSOK D-
010. As a consequence, operators have used different test methods and different acceptable 
leak rates. Since the industry does not currently have a common qualification method, they 
use a variety of standards including; API 11D1/ISO 14310, API 14B/ISO 10417, API 11V1, 
ISO 17078-2, API 14A/ISO 10432 and the NORSOK D-010 (Vignes, 2012). 
It is clear that there is a potential for improvement in the NORSOK D-010 standard regarding 
testing and qualification of GLVs.  
 
4.3.5 Annulus Safety Valve 
During gas-lift of wells, the annulus is filled with gas which amplifies the risk and 
consequences of any potential blowout. The function of the Annulus Safety Valve (ASV) is 
to be a well barrier against the gas in the annulus in order to prevent leakage, in addition to 
being a well barrier against the reservoir. Consequently, the ASV is a part of the primary 
barrier during gas-lift operations, as defined in NORSOK D-010.  
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Gas lift is used to make the produced fluid lighter, when the reservoir pressure does not 
provide the required pressure. As reservoirs continue to get depleted, an increased use of gas 
lift on the NCS is expected. Ever since the Piper Alpha incident in 1988, where the ignition 
of a gas leak resulted in 167 casualties and total destruction of the platform, an ASV has been 
a required well barrier element for any wells on gas-lift (Ptil, 2012). 
 
The PSA/NPD have the recent years received applications for exemptions related to HSE 
issues regarding the use of ASV in gas lift wells and as a result, a survey was conducted 
amongst operator companies to discuss the amount of applications for exemptions to the 
PSA/NPD, the regulations concerning ASVs and the ability to meet these and the accuracy of 
risk assessments done (Ptil, 2004).  
 
It was clear from the survey that the installation and workover phase of ASVs significantly 
contributed to the total risk regarding gas lift operations, and that in subsea installations, the 
ASV had insignificant risk reducing effects. 
 
Some of the key risk factors with regards to ASV include (Ptil, 2004) (Zwaag, 2004); 
 Type of installation 
 Type of operations 
 Number of gas lift wells 
 Annular Volumes and pressure conditions 
 Production volumes 
 Production phase and remaining reservoir energy 
 Other work (interventions, workovers) 
 
The industry had together identified and tested other compensating measures to reduce the 
risk, including (Ptil, 2004) (Zwaag, 2004); 
 Reinforced double block valves 
 Check valves integrated in the wellhead 
 Shorter test intervals for double block or check valves 
 Deep-set safety valves (below production packer) 
 Automatic depressurization system 
 Use of inert lifting gas (particularly relevant for intermittent gas lift) 
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 Dual string completions 
 Gas cap gas lift 
  
 It was concluded with, that a change should be done to the Facilities Regulations regarding 
the requirement for an Annulus Safety Valve, as the ASV operations could have negative 
impact on well integrity, and because of the amount of risk compensating measures available. 
1st January 2005, the regulation was changed to exclude the specific ASV requirement. The 
new regulation now read; “Completion strings shall be equipped with necessary downhole 
safety valves (SCSSV) in the well flow line and in the production annulus” 
 
Another factor to consider is the setting depth of the ASVs. Normally the ASV is installed a 
few hundred feet below sea level. Benefits can be had by moving the setting depth of ASV 
further down, sub-surface.  
The required amount of gas-lift gas required in the annulus is reduced which means the risk 
related to this gas is reduced. For deep wells this equates to big volumes of gas. 
Another risk related to ASV setting depth, is the possibility of vessels colliding with a wells 
on gas-lift, which could release huge amount of gas to surface. By moving the ASV setting 
depth further down, the integrity of the annulus containing gas-lift gas is improved. 
 
4.3.6 Wellhead and Xmas tree 
 
The Wellhead serves as a suspension point casing strings and seals, and as a platform for 
surface equipment such as X-mas tree. The most common issues regarding the wellhead are 
leakages from annulus A to annulus B, caused by ineffective sealing in the wellhead. 
 
The X-mas tree is a type of equipment placed on top of the wellhead after completion of the 
well and consists of an assembly of valves whose primary function is to control the flow of 
the produced fluid. The X-mas tree is also used for monitoring and measuring purposes.  
One of the main well integrity issues regarding the X-mas tree is leaking valves. 
In order to mitigate this problem, routinely audits should be done in order to discover leaks, 
and routinely maintenance should be conducted in order to prevent leaks from occurring and 
to discover other issues like scale build-up.  
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Another common problem which affects the X-mas tree is corrosion which may come as a 
result of the producing fluid. For wells producing from sand-reservoir, erosion caused by 
sand production could become an issue. 
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Chapter 5. Other factors affecting well integrity 
 
 
In addition to the pre-mentioned well integrity issues, other issues may occur during the 
lifecycle of a well. These include operational issues, challenges related to geology and human 
factors. This thesis will however not go into the details of these challenges. 
 
5.1 OPERATIONAL CHALLENGES 
 
Scaling, wax deposits and gas hydration may occur during both drilling and production phase 
and could cause pressure fluctuations and blockages in pipelines and equipment. A proactive 
approach, by chemical inhibitors and routinely maintenance is desirable. 
 
Sand production could occur from sandstone reservoirs and could erode pipelines and 
equipment and affect the casing integrity. Also here, a proactive approach is recommended 
by using proper sand-control methods in order to reduce sand-production issues.  
 
5.2 GEOLOGICAL CHALLENGES 
 
When hydrocarbons are produced from a reservoir, a reduction in reservoir pressure is seen. 
This may call for the need of artificial lift methods, like injection or gas-lift to maintain 
production. A secondary consequence as the liquid is removed is the compression of the 
pores in the rock, which could lead to a subsidence of the entire field. A subsidence of the 
reservoir causes a ripple effect where even the seabed subsides. This affects both platforms 
and wells and could cause major well integrity problems. 
 
In the mid-1980s, this phenomenon was observed in the Ekofisk field which led to an 
operation, where the platforms on the Ekofisk field had to be jacked up 6 meters, an operation 
later known as the „great jack-up‟. Re-injection could however slow down the subsidence. 
This is also something that could be taken into account when designing new fields and 
platforms. 
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A more situational dependent issue is tectonic movement and earthquakes, which could cause 
displacement of well and consequently lead to well integrity related issues.  
 
5.3 HUMAN FACTORS 
In almost every well incident and major blowout that has occurred, the human factor has 
always played a vital role. In order to reduce the influence of the human factor in well 
operations, it is important that the people involved have sufficient well integrity competence. 
 
Proper training of personnel could act as a strong barrier against unwanted accidents. 
Another factor that improves safety is a broad, collective group-experience, meaning the 
personnel as a whole has experience and competence from different types of operations or 
have various professional backgrounds. In recent years this factor has been covered by the 
use of integrated operations where information is shared amongst several experts with 
different backgrounds.
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Chapter 6. Blowouts 
 
 
Exploration drilling, workover and development drilling are the operations most prone to 
blowouts and kicks, due to drilling into high pressure zones, swabbing effects, formation 
breakdown or barrier failures. Having reliable information about formation pressure and 
planning accordingly is a vital preventive step. 
 
Well control is continuously improving by enhanced technology and required blowout 
schools, but the challenge of detecting, handling and controlling kicks for offshore workers 
remain more or less the same. Technology might improve safety and productivity, but also 
pushes the boundaries with respect to what is controllable. Drilling in deeper waters, forcing 
a deeper setting point of surface casings, combined with diverter-less drilling will increase 
the risk, and are often not met with corresponding procedures for kick detection and killing 
procedures. Big improvements have however been made the last decades with respect 
shallow gas safety, like shallow seismic and kick detection for floating rigs.      
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6.1 BLOWOUT DATABASES 
 
Lessons can be learned by looking at some of the common causes for blowouts and well 
releases, and by sharing this knowledge perhaps reduce the probability of such events 
happening in the future. As a result of this, blowout databases can prove to be a useful tool 
for analyzing blowouts and trends, and building an understanding so that blowout can be 
avoided. 
 
6.1.1 Gulf Coast Blowout database  
To further understand and mitigate blowouts in order to avoid costs and loss of lives, a study 
initiated by Hughes, Podio and Sepehroori was conducted in the Gulf coast area and 
adjoining states (Skalle, et al., 1998). The aim of the study was to create a database with 
blowout data.  
From the period 1960-1996, blowout data from over 800 blowouts was gathered by 
contributions from the companies; 
 State Oil and Gas Board of Alabama 
 Louisiana Office and Conservation 
 Mississippi State Oil and Gas Board 
 Texas Railroad Commission (RRC) 
 Minerals Management Service (MMS) (Outer continental Shelf) 
   
Well reports were not mandatory in the US before 1973 and data gathered from before this 
time is often insufficient or inaccurate. A distinction between well kicks and blowout  
was also not clear at this time, and were often reported together. Well events from before 
1960 was therefore excluded from the database. Data quality was however improved later on, 
especially after 1973 when reports were made mandatory. 
Kicks causing extraordinary problems like stuck pipe, loss of circulation, and underground 
communication have been included in the database while well kicks circulated out in a 
controlled manner have not. 
As of December 2011, 17 companies are contributing data to this database.    
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Drilling activity vs. Blowouts 
By analyzing the database, trends and statistics are revealed. As seen in Figure 31, numbers 
of blowouts were at its highest in the early 80s. This corresponds to the high level of well 
activity in this period as seen on Figure 32.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 31: Blowout frequency in the US [Based on (Skalle, et al., 1998)] 
 
  
Figure 32: Well activity in the US [Based on (Skalle, et al., 1998)] 
 
As seen in Table 4, Texas contributes to around 50% of the total amount of blowouts in the 
database, when looking at blowouts between 1960 and 1996.  
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Table 4: Overall activity and no. of blowouts between 1960 and 1996 [Based on (Skalle, et al., 1998)] 
Area No. of 
blowouts 
No of drilled 
wells 
Footage 
drilled 
Blowouts pr. 
100 wells 1000 ft 
Alabama 
Louisiana 
Mississippi* 
OCS* 
Texas* 
9 
123 
20 
245 
450 
** 
29 000 
11 000 
180 000 
310 000 
** ** 
0.42 
0.18 
0.14 
0.15 
** 
All 847 530 000  0.16  
*   Estimated value before all data has been compiled. 
** Missing data. 
 
By normalizing well activity and number of blowouts, a blowout risk assessment can be 
made. This is done by dividing blowout frequencies on amount of wells being drilled. In 
Figure 33, blowout frequencies for Texas are presented. 
 
 
Figure 33: Blowout frequencies for Texas [Based on (Skalle, et al., 1998)] 
 
As seen, the blowout frequency in Texas is stable and seems independent of the activity level, 
despite the fact that Texas contributes to around 50% of the activities. 
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During this period, improvements were done to regulations, equipment inspection and 
blowout prevention training for drillers and supervisors. Despite the improved this made in 
kick detection and kick control, no noticeable improvements were observed. 
 
This could be explained by the fact that the drillers were paid per foot drilled, and therefore 
might‟ve compromised the increased kick safety by increasing drilling rate, reducing non-
productive time, tripping too fast or check for minor influxes in order to maximizing revenue. 
 
Blowout depths 
Blowouts in Texas and Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) were also compared to the depths at 
which they occurred.  
Deeper wells experience greater well pressure from high pore pressure gradients, increased 
exposure time from open-hole sections, increased tripping time and are more prone to lost 
circulations problems. They should in theory experience more blowouts than shallow wells. 
From  
Figure 34 however, it is observed that most blowouts occurred at shallow depths.  
 
 
Figure 34: Blowouts in Texas and OCS vs. Depth [Based on (Skalle, et al., 1998)] 
This can be explained by the fact that the number of wells drilled at this depth, heavily 
outweighs the number of deeper wells, and therefore are more likely to experience a blowout.  
By looking at the last casing set before the blowout occurred (Figure 35), and thereby 
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excluding the number of wells factor, it is observed that blowout frequencies are greater for 
smaller casing diameters, i.e. deeper wells, as expected.  
 
 
Figure 35: Number of blowouts in Texas and OCS vs. casing size [Based on (Skalle, et al., 1998)] 
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Type of Operation 
 
Blowout frequencies heavily depend on what type of operation which is active. In Figure 36, 
number of blowouts is shown vs. various active operations, such as exploration drilling, 
development drilling, workover, completion and wire line operations. 
 
 
Figure 36: Blowouts vs. operation type for Texas and OCS wells [Based on (Skalle, et al., 1998)] 
 
As observed, most blowouts occur in the drilling phase, specifically during drilling into 
unknown geology, tripping and being out of the hole. Drilling into unknown geology might 
present a challenge with regards well control, due to higher formation pressure than expected, 
combined with low mud weight, gas cut or swabbing. Another common issue is formation 
breakdown due to high ECD, causing fractures and loss of circulation.  
A full list of barrier failure frequencies causing blowouts is presented in Table 5. 
 
Table 5: Most frequent barrier failures for all phases (Louisiana + Tx + OCS) [Based on (Skalle, et al., 
1998)] 
Primary barrier BO Secondary barrier BO 
Swabbing 
Low mud weight 
Drilling beak/ unexp. high pressure 
Formation breakdown/Lost circ. 
158 
50 
45 
43 
Failed to close BOP 
  Rams not seated 
  Unloaded too quickly 
  DC/Kelly/TJ/WL in BOP 
78 
14 
13 
5 
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Wellhead failure 
Trapped/expanding gas 
Gas cut mud 
X-mas tree failure 
While cement setting 
Unknown why 
Poor cement 
Tubing Leak 
Improper fill up 
Tubing burst 
Tubing plug failure 
Packer leakage 
Annular losses 
Uncertain reservoir depth/pressure 
40 
40 
33 
23 
20 
19 
16 
15 
13 
10 
90 
6 
6 
6 
BOP failed after closure 
BOP not in place 
Fracture at casing shoe 
Failed to stab valve/Kelly/TIW 
Casing leakage 
Diverter – no problem 
String safety valve failed 
Diverter failed after closure 
Form. Breakdown/Lost circ 
String failure 
Casing valve failed 
Wellhead seal failed 
Failed to operate diverter 
X-mas tree failed 
66 
43 
38 
34 
23 
21 
19 
17 
15 
13 
11 
10 
7 
7 
 
 
Improvements 
In order to break the trend discussed earlier to maximize revenue by ignoring well safety, 
Wylie & Visram made suggestions that could improve well safety offshore. 
By changing footage-contract for day work contracts, workers would no longer take 
unnecessary risks in order to make profit (Skalle, et al., 1998). Operators could also take 
greater care by specifying minimum mud density, as this is one of the main causes of well 
kicks, as seen in Table 5. A bonus program, focusing on minimizing kicks could also prove 
useful. 
 
Better reporting of well kicks was also proposed. Every kick report should be made public 
and reviewed and analyzed. In that way they could provide the industry with better 
understanding and knowledge of well kicks, which could then be used to improve 
understanding and mitigation of well kicks and blowouts.   
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6.1.2 SINTEF Blowout Database 
SINTEF initiated in 1984 a blowout database, containing well description, drilling and 
production data, with input from several companies (Holand, et al., 2011). The data 
contributed are of wells from all over the world, but data from the NCS and the GoM are 
more substantial and can therefore provide a better picture of trends in these places.      
In order for the database to have consistent data, a set of definitions have to be in place. 
 
Blowout definition  
The SINTEF blowout database uses PSAs definition of a blowout, found in “Activity 
Regulations”; “A blowout is an incident where formation fluid flows out of the well or 
between formation layers after all the predefined technical well barriers or the activation of 
the same has failed” (Ptil, 2012). 
 
Well release definition 
An incident is a well release if oil or gas flowed from the well from some point were flow 
was not intended and the flow was stopped by use of the barrier system that was available on 
the well at the time the incident started. 
 
Shallow gas definition 
Any gas zone penetrated before the BOP has been installed. Any zone penetrated after the 
BOP is installed is not shallow gas. 
This is the typical Norwegian definition, but for some GoM incidents this is not valid because 
the reservoir there varies greatly in depth, and sometimes the wells are drilled deep before the 
BOP is installed, or a diverter is used. 
It is therefore not easy to differentiate between shallow gas and blowout in many cases. 
 
Database structure 
To build up a detailed and descriptive database of the blowouts, several fields of data have to 
be entered. 51 fields, grouped into six main categories are used to describe the blowouts in 
detail: 
 
“1. Category and location”, describes the severity of the well incident, whether it‟s a well 
leak or a blowout, the location of the well, operator, type of installation and water depth. 
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“2. Well description” is more detailed information about the well, such wellbore and casing 
depths, casing size, mud weight, pressures, Gas Oil Ratio (GOR) and formation data. 
 
“3. Present operation” describes what kind of phase (exploration, workover etc.), operation 
(running casing etc.) and activity (cementing etc.) that was active when the blowout occurred. 
 
“4. Blowout causes” describes any potential external causes for the blowout, loss of any 
barriers and explanation of how these were lost, and any relevant human factors.  
 
Human factors are often not regarded as reliable info as these data are frequently masked. 
 
“5. Blowout characteristics” describe aspects like flow-path, flow-rate, release point, ignition 
type, duration, fatalities and losses. 
 
“6. Other” includes control method, remarks that describe the incident, data quality, revision 
date and references. 
 
The purpose of the database is to give an overview of the offshore blowouts, well release 
characteristics and frequencies. By analyzing data with regards to blowout frequencies, a risk 
assessment can be made and estimate the likelihood of a blowout to occur. 
 
When analyzing frequencies of blowouts it is practical to compare installations with similar 
standards. The SINTEF Blowout database uses the North Sea Standard as one measurement 
of the quality, a standard which can be applied to both North Sea and GoM installations 
(OGP - Risk Assessment Data Directory, 2010). 
 
The result of the International Association of Oil & Gas Producers (OGP) risk assessment 
report is presented in Figure 37 . It shows blowout frequencies from offshore installations 
from GoM, OCS, UKCS, and NCS from the period 1
st
 January 1980 to 1
st
 January 2005.    
 
The numbers presented are from installations with North Sea Standard and should only be 
used as a risk assessment tool for NCS and GoM installations. It could also be used for non-
North Sea installations, given that the standard is on the same level. 
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Figure 37: Blowout and well release frequencies for offshore operations (Holand, et al., 2011) (OGP, 2010) 
 
As seen from Figure 37, in deep exploration wells, almost 2% of the wells experience well 
releases. At worst, almost one out of every thousand exploration wells experience shallow 
gas blowouts. The room for improvement is definitely present. 
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6.2 REPORTED BLOWOUTS & WELL INCIDENTS 
 
Below, some of the major accidents and blowouts the recent years are presented, starting with 
the Ekofisk Bravo blowout in 1977, to the more recent gas blowout in Totals Elgin field in 
2012. 
 
6.2.1 Ekofisk B-14 – 1977 
 
Summary 
On April 22
nd
, 1977, the production platform B-14 on the Phillips Petroleum Norway 
operated (Now ConocoPhillips); Ekofisk field experienced an oil and gas blowout 
(Granskingskommisjonen oppnevnt ved kongelig resolusjon, 1977). 
 
The incident happened during a workover when 10 000 feet of production tubing was to be 
pulled out of the well. Before pulling the tubing, a Downhole Safety Valve (DHSV) was 
planned to be installed, followed by removal of the X-mas tree and finally installation of the 
BOP. 
In the time period between removing the X-mas tree and installing the BOP, the only barriers 
in the well are the DHSV and the heavy mud. It was in this time period the blowout occurred. 
 
The DHSV was later found on deck without visible damage; it had been blown out of the 
tubing. This finding lead to the conclusion, that the DHSV had not been locked into the 
seating nipple during the installation. There were two warning signs however, which meant 
the blowout could‟ve been avoided if proper actions had been taken. 
 
1. Mud was observed flowing out of the control line from the DHSV. 
2. After removal of the X-mas tree, mud was seen flowing up through the tubing. 
 
A follow-up on any of these warnings could‟ve resulted in ceasing of the operation. 
 
A workover program, approved by the Norwegian Petroleum Department (NPD), had in 1976 
been made where it was stated that a back pressure valve was to be installed in the tubing 
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hanger. No drawings or documentation where made to determine whether or not the tubing 
hanger used on the B-14 well were of the type where this was possible. It was therefore 
decided to use a DHSV instead. In addition, the already approved well kill program was 
changed. The NPD was not informed of any of these changes, which is a violation of the 
regulations.  
It was also discovered in the report following the blowout, that it required seven attempts to 
install the DHSV, and that the work was characterized by improvisations and disagreements 
between the crew. On the final attempt of installing a DHSV, technical difficulties occurred 
which lead to the DHSV not being locked in place. This was not done, and the DHSV was 
also not pressure tested. At this point, the operator had not slept for over 30 hours, and may 
have played a part in the decision making process. 
The installation of the BOP was also a process that was slowed down, as this was dismantled 
into two parts when the X-mas tree was removed. The time period between the removal of 
the X-mas tree and the installation of the BOP should be as little as possible as this is a very 
critical time frame. Had the BOP been installed earlier, the blowout might‟ve been prevented. 
 
Conclusion 
The following barriers were breached on the Bravo-14 well: 
 
Table 6: Bravo-14 barrier breaches 
Barriers breached / Causes Comments 
Regulations  Insufficient reporting of changes 
Organization  Improper documentation 
 Weaknesses in the WO program 
 Improper planning of work 
Human factor  Improvisation of procedures 
 Misjudgment of critical situations 
 Weak leadership and control 
Valves  DHSV not properly locked in place 
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6.2.2 Saga 2/4-14 – 1989 
 
Summary 
In October 1988, Saga Petroleum drilled a wildcat subsea exploration well, 2/4-14, with the 
semi-sub Treasure Saga (NPD, 2012) (Ølberg, et al., 1991) (Leraand, et al., 1992) (Aadnøy, 
et al., 1990). Drilling went on without problems until they reached the 8 ½” section at a depth 
of 4713m near the top of reservoir, where the pore pressure increased rapidly from 1,65 s.g. 
to 2.11 s.g. The return mud became significantly less dense than it should be; indicating a gas 
cut had been made. The gas reading was 68% at the highest.  
 
Mud weight was increased to 2.10 s.g., giving the mud a weight close to the fracture gradient, 
and an equivalent circulating density (ECD) above the fracture gradient, at the given pump 
rate.  
Several weak formations were encountered, resulting in a small margin between potential 
influx and lost circulation. After a well kick occurred at 4734m with a 6.5m
3
 gain, the well 
was shut in. Attempts were made to regain control but were unsuccessful. 
It was decided to cement the bottom-hole assembly and sidetrack. 
During pumping of the cement, the drill pipe became plugged, and coiled tubing was run in to 
clear the obstructions. 
During this period, well control was lost, causing the shear-rams to cut the drill pipe, leaving 
approximately 4500m of drill pipe with coiled tubing in the hole (Figure 38). With the BOP 
closed, the shut in wellhead pressure reached 10 000 psi.  
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Figure 38: Status of well 2/4-14 after BOP closed (Ølberg, et al., 1991) 
 
The well was now turning into an underground blowout, a situation where the uncontrolled 
reservoir fluid flows from one reservoir, along the wellbore and into another reservoir 
(Schlumberger, 2012). These blowouts are generally a more expensive affair than surface 
blowouts and a second relief or kill well are often necessary to regain control.  
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A bull heading operation with heavy mud was attempted down the kill line but the flex hose 
burst.  A safety plug and a no-go cap was placed in the BOP and the annular preventer (AP) 
was closed. The well was now suspended, awaiting re-entry by a different rig. Treasure Saga 
was pulled off location.  
 
A plan was made to start a high pressure snubbing operation, in order to fish the tubing and 
CT out of the hole so it could be plugged satisfactory. Parallel to this, a kill well was being 
drilled (2/4-15S), in case killing the well with 2/4-14 was unsuccessful. 
 
January 31
st
 1989, Treasure Saga started drilling the relief well, 2/4-15S, about 1 km south of 
well 2/4-14.  
The well was planned as build, hold and drop well as seen in Figure 39. 
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Figure 39: Planned well trajectory of the relief well (Ølberg, et al., 1991) 
 
The relief well was considered a challenging operation because of the great depth, high 
temperatures, unknown reservoir parameters and the fishing operation needed in well 2/4-14.  
 
May 1
st
 1989, re-entry of 2/4-14 well commenced, using the jack-up drilling rig, Neddrill 
Trigon. It was discovered that the wellhead pressure had decreased from 10 000 psi to 2800 
psi.  
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Five possible explanations were presented;  
 
1) An underground cross flow below the 9 5/8” casing shoe. 
2) Bridging of the well after fracture of the 9 5/8” casing shoe. 
3) Bridging of the well after bursting of the 9 5/8” casing. 
4) Underground blowout through the bursted 9 5/8” casing. 
5) Initial gas on top of the well had gone back into solution after the well had bridged. 
 
Option #2 was elected the most likely scenario based on the design parameters of the 9 5/8” 
casing and the stability of the pressure.  
 
May 9
th
 1989, the drill pipe was reconnected and three days later, fishing of the coiled tubing 
started.  Indications of well flow were seen, and to verify, a packer was set in the drill pipe 
below the packoff overshot. This packer was blown out of the drill pipe. A production 
logging tool (PLT) was run inside the drill pipe which confirmed the leak in the overshot with 
a flow of 2900 m
3
/d (18 000 bbl/d). Shallow seismic were shot and indicated an anomaly in 
the sand formation at 828-878 m depth. It was concluded that an underground blowout was 
happening, with the 9 5/8” and the 13 3/8” casing most likely bursted.  
 
In the relief well, 2/4-15S, the 9 5/8” had now been set. As the work began to replace the 
leaking packoff overshot in well 2/4-14, a sharp increase in gas readings were observed in the 
relief well. This was believed to be caused by either fractures around the 9 5/8” casing shoe, 
representing a permanent communication, or by the pressure increase in bottom hole pressure 
in 2/4-14 as a result of the bullheading operation. To verify, drilling of the relief well was 
suspended for five weeks, and gas readings were observed. It was concluded that the increase 
in gas readings were due to the bullheading operation and that there were no permanent 
communication.  
 
To kill the well, it was decided to use both 2/4-14 and 2/4-15S together.  
In 2/4-14, a tieback string with a purpose built packer was planned to be run. A sliding sleeve 
installed above the packer could be set at an open position, allowing the tie back string to be 
run in the hole without the experience of a massive differential pressure. 
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The drill pipe had by this time been cemented, and cut at 4061m.  
A PLT run showed that the well was flowing through the bottom hole assembly (BHA) and 
cut drill pipe with a flow of 5100 m
3
/d (32 000 bbl/d) and a pressure of 3770 psi.  
 
By October 15
th
 1989, the cut drill string had been fished out of the hole, and as a last 
preparation before running the tie-back and packer, a milling assembly was run in order to 
verify that no obstructions were left in the hole. When pulling the milling tool out of the hole, 
it came apart above the back pressure valves resulting in a minor blowout. The shear rams 
were activated and the well was shut it. 
 
The situation now worsened as not only the drill pipe had to be recovered, but the 9 5/8” 
casing had also parted, preventing the tieback plan (Figure 40). 
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Figure 40: Status of the wells before kill operation started [Based on (Hide, 1994)] 
 
Initially, a dynamic kill operation was planned, and a two-phase pipe flow simulation was run 
to more accurately determine the needed kill fluid volumes, duration of pumping periods and 
time plots of important parameters. A dynamic kill uses frictional pressure as a supplement to 
the hydrostatic pressure in order to kill the well.   
 
The stimulation vessel Big Orange 18, and the supply boat Far Scotchman, were aiding in the 
kill operation by providing additional storage and pumping of kill mud. 
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A 2.25 s.g. leakoff test (LOT) was performed in the relief well. A mud weight of 2.25 s.g. 
was planned for the well kill so a high LOT was essential. A special made drill bit with 
increased nozzle flow area was used, in order to avoid any potential plugging if pumping of 
loss circulation material (LCM) was needed. 
  
As drilling of the relief well, 2/4-15S continued, an instant 1m drop of the drill bit occurred at 
4705m TVD. Return of mud ceased, indicating that communication between the two wells 
was established. Mud was lost from the relief well at a rate of 12 barrels per minute but was 
constantly topped up with 1.95 s.g. mud.  
After a PLT showed that all the mud lost from the relief well were entering the 2/4-14 well, 
2.25 s.g. kill mud was pumped down the well followed by a temperature degradable mud 
plug. The hydrostatic pressure killed the well. 
 
The work now began to clear the well for all junk. By March 2
nd
 1990, the parted 9 5/8” 
casing had been recovered down to 890m and the well cleared to 3650m. By April 14
th
, 1990 
the well was finally plugged and abandoned. 
 
One of the success factors for this operation were the continuously maintenance and 
developing of contingency plans. The use of a kill simulator proved a valuable tool for 
planning of the kill operation. The chosen relief well path showed a reduced ellipse of 
uncertainty, giving a high probability of hitting the main well. 
 
During the handling of this blowout, a rock mechanics theory, regarding borehole 
breakthrough was developed. Borehole breakthrough occurred when the wellbores were 
approximately 1m apart, and nearly instantly. Communication between the wells as a result 
of fracturing is unlikely. Because of the high hoop stress around the flowing well, a fracture 
would most likely bypass it (Figure 41). 
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Figure 41: Effect of hoop stress on propagating fractures [Based on (Aadnøy, et al., 1990)] 
 
 
Conclusion 
The following barriers were breached on the Saga 2/4-14 well: 
 
Table 7: Saga 2/4-14 barrier breaches 
Barriers breached / Causes Comments 
Organization  Risk management / Well planning 
 Insufficient contingencies (?) 
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6.2.3 Snorre A – 2004 
 
Summary 
The Snorre field has been an oil and gas producing field since 1992. The field was operated 
by Saga Petroleum, until 1999 when Norsk Hydro took over. By the end of 2002, Statoil 
became then operator of the field. Snorre A is a floating rig, managing drilling and 
production as well as accommodation facilities. 
 
November 28
th
, 2004, during preparations to drilling a sidetrack, a scab liner was pulled out 
of the hole, causing gas to enter the well (Brattbakk, et al., 2005) (Ptil, 2004) (SINTEF, 
2011). 
A scab liner is a repair technique used to isolate a breach or to seal off old perforations and 
consist of a smaller diameter pipe with packers on top and bottom (SPE, 2012).  
 
The scab liner was initially placed in the well back in 1995 to isolate holes in the 9 5/8” 
casing as a result of a stuck pipe and related cleanup operations. The breach of the 9 5/8” 
casing was known to Statoil, and by pulling the scab liner, they were in fact compromising 
their secondary barrier. 
As the liner was removed, gas flowed freely through the hole in the 9 5/8” casing hole, and 
continued through an unknown breach in the 13 3/8” casing.  
 
This caused a gas seabed blowout to occur (Figure 42), compromising the safety of the 216 
people on board the rig. Non-critical personnel were evacuated shortly after the blowout, 
while the remaining people carried out the emergency response. The situation was under 
control the following day, and no personnel were injured. 
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Figure 42: Snorre A – Shallow gas blowout (Wackers, et al., 2008) 
 
 
The blowout was later characterized by the Norwegian Authorities as the most serious 
incident to ever have occurred in the North Sea. This was based, not because of the direct 
consequences of the incident, but of the destructive potential this incident had.  
 
Investigation reports by PSA and Statoil 
An investigation of the incident was launched by PSA, where several flaws in Statoil‟s 
organizational barriers was found, including inadequate risk analysis, failure to follow 
governing documentation, flaws in the management involvement and well barrier breaches 
(Statoil, 2005). Statoil was ordered by PSA to perform an investigation as well, figuring out 
what went wrong, and implement measures to prevent similar situations to arise again. 
 
The investigation made by Statoil was based on reviews of documents, questionnaire surveys 
and by interviewing of involved personnel, both onshore and offshore. Data acquisition was 
based on the pentagon model, covering; 
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 Technology and operations 
 Formal organization (structure, governing regulations) 
 Values, attitudes and competence 
 Social relations and network 
 Work processes (cooperation, communication, incentive structures, and leadership)  
  
As a result of the investigation, the report painted a picture of a platform, working with a high 
operational risk where relatively low safety margins were accepted in terms of reviewing 
potentially risky operations. Reports of serious incidents and near-incidents on Snore A prior 
to this incident was also brought to light as well as frequent equipment breakdowns and 
operating problems.  
 
The platform was deemed to be in a reduced technical condition. Statoil had plans to renew 
the platform, but at the time of the incident, little had been done regarding this. 
This was thought to affect attitudes and working habits, which consequentially influenced 
attention to risk assessment. 
It was also reported that knowledge and familiarity with governing documentation varied 
amongst the workers, due to lack of training or general ignorance, even within their own area 
of work. 
 
Actions taken and actions planned 
As a result of the investigation, measurements to improve planning, risk assessment and 
management involvement in drilling operations was implemented by Statoil (Pettersen, et al., 
2006). The subsurface group was also strengthened by adding several expert positions. 
 
To increase the awareness and expertise of well integrity control on Snorre, compulsory well 
integrity seminars has been introduced, which focuses on knowledge transfer and well 
control. Work has also begun regarding reviewing the well integrity status of Snorre as well 
as other Statoil operated wells on the NCS. 
 
To improve cooperation and communication between onshore and offshore, Snorre started 
with daily operational meetings with onshore personnel, discussing drilling programs and 
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related risks. This way, offshore personnel are more actively involved in preparations 
regarding well planning and drilling programs. 
 
A subsurface support centre was introduced, providing support, following drilling operations 
on a day-to-day basis and making sure expertise and knowledge is utilized in well planning 
and operations. 
 
Other actions were also planned, like upgrading the Snorre platform to ensure it is technical 
safe and more robust. Personnel with drilling and well expertise were to be added to the 
subsurface group, to improve quality assurance and risk assessments. 
 
Governing documentation was going to be simplified, and unnecessary documents removed, 
in addition to implement further training programs to raise the awareness and expertise 
around this.  
Management training and reorganizing of the administrative duties was also planned in order 
to reduce the work load of operational managers so that they could take a more active part in 
well planning and management of resources. 
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Conclusion 
The following barrier breaches caused the Snorre A incident; 
 
Table 8: Snorre A barrier breaches 
Barriers breached / Causes Comments 
Casing  Unknown breach in 13 3/8” casing 
Regulations  Did not meet barrier requirements 
 Several other (28 found by PSA) 
violations of regulations 
Organization  Insufficient use of controlling 
documents / WBS 
 Insufficient understanding and 
execution of risk management. 
 Inadequate management 
involvement. 
Human factors  Bad decision making 
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6.2.4 Montara – 2009 
 
Summary 
On the August 21
th
 2009, the Montara well located in Western Australia experienced a 
blowout which lead to loss of the platform, loss of the West Atlas drilling rig, and an oil spill 
which caused major environmental damages (Australian Government, 2011) (SINTEF, 
2011). 
 
Figure 43: Montara well incident (PTTEP Australasia, 2011) 
 
Montara was a suspended well without tested or verified barriers, and one of the barriers that 
should‟ve been installed was missing (Vignes, 2012). The 9 5/8” casing had been cemented, 
but even though some challenges occurred during the cement job, no pressure tests were 
conducted, leaving this “barrier” unverified.  Two pressure controlling anti-corrosion caps 
(PCCC) acting as secondary barrier elements were planned to be installed. However, 
according to the manufacturer of the PCCCs, these were not suitable as well barrier elements.  
 
Only one (9 5/8”) of the planned PCCCs was installed, and this was left untested. 
As a result of this, the 13 3/8” casing threads corroded and had to be cleaned, which meant 
the 9 5/8” PCCCs had to be removed. This meant the well was now left with no tested 
barriers and only the untested 9 5/8” casing shoe cement remained as a barrier against the 
reservoir. The fluid left inside the casing, acting primary barrier during drilling operations, 
was thought to have sufficient overbalance pressure to the pore pressure. This was however 
not the case, and the fluid was also not monitored.  
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15 hours after the 9 5/8” PCCC was removed, hydrocarbons started to flow at a rate of an 
estimated 400 barrels per day. The point of leak was through the cemented casing shoe, and 
up through the 9 5/8” casing. At this point, the situation was as seen on Figure 44 (PTTEP 
Australasia, 2011); 
 
 
Figure 44: Montara well at the time of the incident (PTTEP Australasia, 2011) 
 
1. No BOP in place 
2. No PCCP had been re-installed – well was open to atmosphere 
3. There was no effective barrier in the shoe track 
4. There was no completion Brine – Casing was filled with seawater 
5. There was no isolating cement plug in the upper wellbore 
 
On September 14
th
, 2009, drilling of a relief well started using the West Triton rig and after 
five weeks, the well was successfully intercepted. On November 1
st
, a fire broke out on the 
West Atlas drilling rig and Montara platform but 2 days later the fire was extinguished and 
the well killed. 
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Conclusion  
The following barriers were breached on the Montara well: 
 
Table 9: Montara barrier breaches 
Barriers breached / Causes Comments 
Regulations  Failure to maintain two well 
barriers 
Human factor  Failure to verify barrier 
 Bad decision making. 
Organization  Insufficient well integrity 
competence. 
 Shortcomings regarding procedures 
and steering documents. 
 Lack of communication. 
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6.2.5 Deepwater Horizon - 2010  
 
Introduction 
One of the most talked about accident the recent years is the Deepwater Horizon accident 
from April 20
th
 2010. The Macondo exploration well was drilled by a semi-submersible to a 
depth of approximately 18000 ft. in the Gulf of Mexico when a series of accidents occurred, 
causing one of the biggest accidents and oil spill in history with a discharge of almost five 
million barrels during the course of 87 days. In addition to the environmental damages, 11 
lives were lost as a result of the fire and explosion (SINTEF, 2011). 
 
 
 
Figure 45: Deepwater Horizon Incident – 2010 (Neatorama, 2010) 
 
May 22
nd
 2010, president Obama announced the creation of the “National Commission on the 
BP Deepwater Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling”, an impartial commission in charge of 
analyzing and finding the cause of the accident, improving the country‟s ability to respond to 
such events and to recommend reforms to make offshore production safer. 
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As a result of this analysis, a detailed report was made to the president (The bureau of ocean 
energy management, regulation and enforcement, 2011). 
From the report it was concluded that this accident could‟ve been prevented and several 
identifiable mistakes by BP, Halliburton and Transocean were discovered (BP, 2010) 
(Hubbard, et al., 2010). Eight critical barrier breaches was said to be the cause of the 
blowout, which were also found to be the case in BP‟s official report. 
 
Summary 
The well has had some issues in the past; In October 2009 it experienced a kick during a 
drilling operation. March 8
th
, 2010 another kick was taken, causing the drill pipe to become 
stuck, leading to cutting of the drill pipe and sidetracking the well. 
 
Once it reached the depth of 18360 feet, slightly shallower than originally planned, the 
production casing was run. A debate arose because of the design and lack of sufficient 
centralizers on the production casing. The design indicated that 21 centralizers were needed, 
but only 7 centralizers were initially supplied. The remaining centralizers were shipped to 
Deepwater Horizon from Halliburton, but these were thought to be of incorrect size and were 
not used.  
The casing and hydrocarbon formation was cemented and the well was prepared for 
temporary abandonment to be completed by another rig. 
 
Here, the first barrier was breached. The cement used to on to cement the production casing 
and hydrocarbon section was not tested before use. Later laboratory tests indicate that the 
cement used was unstable at these depths and pressures. The cement slurry had high 
emphasis on preventing loss to formation, compromising important factors like foam stability 
and contamination. It was believed that a nitrogen breakout occurred in the shoe track, 
allowing communication between the wellbore and the hydrocarbon formation. 
 
The float collar, a valve allowing fluids to be pumped down, but not up, was not working, 
and cause hydrocarbons to enter the well undetected.   
 
As per procedure, a positive pressure test was performed. Following this, a negative pressure 
test was performed in order to test the barriers for high differential pressures. 
Fluid returns were higher than expected, indicating breach of barriers; this was however not 
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recognized by the rig crew. Witnesses also report that the rig crew did not use BP‟s provided 
procedure when conducting the pressure test, a nonconformity picked up by the well site 
leader. The crew continued the pressure test using BP‟s procedure, a procedure unfamiliar to 
them, which may have compromised the crew‟s ability to perform and interpret the test.   
 
During the pressure test, the drill pipe line experienced a pressure of 1400 psi. This was 
believed by the tool pusher to be caused by a „bladder‟ effect. This was accepted by the site 
leaders and work continued. 
 
As the well become underbalanced again, more hydrocarbons flowed into the well. This 
influx went undetected, possible caused by simultaneous ongoing operations which distracted 
the crew from monitoring the well. Drill pipe pressure continued to increase, indicating that 
hydrocarbons had reached the riser. Well control actions were now taken. 
 
As mud flowed uncontrolled onto the drill floor, the annular preventer was closed, however it 
did not seal properly. The hydrocarbons were then diverted to the mud gas separator (MGS), 
a system designed for low pressures only. High pressure gas was discharged from the MGS, 
and gas alarms were activated. The rig lost power soon after this, following two explosions.   
 
The fires may have caused damage to the Emergency Shutdown (ESD) cables, as the shear 
ram did not did not activate properly, when ESD was initiated by the supervisor. 
A system called AMF (Automated Mode Function) is in place in case of failure to close the 
BOP. The AMF is controlled by control pods placed on the BOP; these did not active either 
due to a failed solenoid valve and a battery with insufficient charge. 
A third option is to active the BOP from a remote operated vehicle. This did close the seal 
rams, but they did not seal the well properly, and the well was still flowing. 
   
Results from the investigation 
There was no single event that caused the Deepwater Horizon accident, but instead a series of 
both organizational and mechanical barrier breaches.  
 
Eight separate critical events caused the major accident.  
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1. The annulus cement did not isolate hydrocarbons due to nitrogen breakout in the 
cement (Figure 46). 
 
 
Figure 46: Nitrogen breakout in the cement [Based on (BP, 2010)] 
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The report shows that there was little focus on foam stability and contamination and 
that the cement was not tested beforehand. Running a cement bonding log (CBL) was 
discussed, however it was decided to not run a CBL. 
Another fact to consider is that Deepwater Horizon was 41 days behind schedule, and 
that this might‟ve influenced the decision making. 
 
2. The shoe track barrier consisting of shoe track cement and check valves, was 
breached.  
 
Figure 47: Shoe track barriers [Based on (BP, 2010)] 
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Some possible causes were identified but not verified; 
 
a. Shoe track Cement: 
1. Contamination of shoe track cement due to nitrogen breakout. 
2. Contamination of shoe track cement due to mud in the 
wellbore. 
3. Inadequate design of the shoe track cement. 
4. Swapping of the shoe track cement with mush in rat hole. 
5. A combination of these factors. 
 
b. Float collar: 
1. Damage caused by high load conditions required to establish 
circulation. 
2. Failure to convert float collar due to insufficient flow rate. 
3. Check valves did not seal. 
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3. Negative pressure test. 
The rig crew were not familiar with BP„s operation guidelines for pressure testing, 
which stated that the kill line should be monitored, and not the drill pipe pressure 
which was the rig crews preferred practice. The negative pressure test was accepted 
despite high pressure increase, explained as “bladder effect”. A clogged kill line may 
also explain why there was no pressure relief when the well was bled off.  
 
 
Figure 48: Conditions during negative pressure test (BP, 2010) 
 
 
4. Influx was not recognized until hydrocarbons were in the riser.  
Analysis show that flow in the well could be seen from real-time data at 20:58 hours, 
however this went unnoticed and no actions were taken until 21.41 hours. The 
Transocean Well Control Handbook states that there should be well monitoring at all 
times, however there was no current policy for how to monitor the well during in-flow 
testing, cleanup or other end-of-well activities. 
 
 Blowouts 
 
130 
 
5. Well control response failed to gain control.  
This was partly due to the late response of well control. The annular preventer did not 
seal the annulus straight away allowing further flow of hydrocarbons.  
It appears from reports and the investigation that the crew was not fully prepared for 
situations like these due to insufficient training.   
 
6. Diverting flow to Mud-gas-separator resulted in gas venting onto the rig.  
The MGS is designed to handle small amounts of gas, and not appropriate for high 
flow conditions like this situation. Had the flow been diverted overboard instead of to 
the MGS, it could‟ve bought the rig crew some more time to react, and avoided gas  
 
7. The fire and gas system did not prevent ignition. 
The fans in Deepwater Horizons engine room was not designed to automatically 
activate if gas was detected, this had to be done manually. As this was not done, the 
hydrocarbon gas was able to reach ignition sources. 
 
8. The BOP emergency mode did not seal the well.  
None of the three ways to activate the BOP was successful. The Emergency 
Disconnect Sequence (EDS), meant to close the shear ram and disconnect the lower 
marine riser package (LMRP) did not work due to possible damage on the multiplex 
cables from the fire.  
The automated mode function (AMF) required at least one working control pod, but 
these were later shown to be inoperable due to lack of battery charge and failed 
solenoid valve.   
The shear ram was finally closed by means of remotely operated vehicle, but for some 
reason the well was not sealed completely. Possible reasons for this could be due to 
prevailing flow conditions in the BOP, insufficient hydraulic power or a non-
shearable section across the shear ram. 
 
Later investigation show signs of lacking maintenance on the BOP and its systems, 
and inaccurate maintenance records. 
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Conclusion 
 
Table 10: Deepwater Horizon barrier breaches 
Barriers breached / Causes Comments 
Well isolation  Insufficient quality of cement (No pre-test or 
CBL run). 
Valves  Check valves did not seal. 
Human factors  Crew did not follow procedures stated in 
controlling documents regarding how to perform 
inflow test. 
 Late response - Crew did not recognize influx and 
did not act on it in time.  
 Bad decision making – Diverting to mud-gas-
separator when this did not have the require 
capacity. 
 Fire and gas detection system was not activated – 
This had to be done manually 
BOP  Failure to active EDS and AMF 
 Did not seal well properly 
Organization  Insufficiencies with practices and procedures 
regarding well control 
 Insufficient well integrity competence 
 Inadequate barrier verification and audits 
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6.2.6 Gullfaks C – 2010 
 
Summary 
In 2010, the Gullfaks C 06A well operated by Statoil, was close to developing into a serious 
well incident (Statoil, 2010) (Statoil, 2010) (Bjørheim, 2010) (SINTEF, 2011). The 19
th
 May, 
the alarm on the already troubled well went off during hole-cleaning of the reservoir section. 
The casing string was breached and a big part of the mud column providing bottom-hole 
pressure was lost underground, resulting in loss of a very important well barrier.  
 
 
Figure 49: Gullfaks C platform (Bjerke, 2011) 
 
Gas from the reservoir section started to uncontrolled flow into the well and up on the drill 
floor. Work began to regain control but the situation worsened the following day, leading to 
evacuation of all non-critical personnel. 
The work to regain the lost barrier and obtain well control went on for over two months. 
Later reports indicate that the gas on the drill floor reached a level where the risk of an 
explosion was present. 
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The fact that the casing breach was the cause of the mud loss was not known at this time, 
providing a challenging operation when trying to regain control of the well. This was the 
third critical incident happening on this well in five months.  
 
Weaknesses about the breached casing string were known to Statoil already in the fall 2009, 
but no action was taken at this time. Later reports show that there were indications of 
pressure build up in the well as early as April due to the leaking casing string; however, this 
was not observed and acted on by Statoil. 
 
The well was drilled with MPD (Managed Pressure Drilling), a method of drilling in zones 
where the pressure window is narrow (SINTEF, 2010). The objective is to accurately manage 
the pressure profile in the annulus by means of adjusting backpressure, variable fluid density 
and rheology and circulation friction.  
Previous experiences with MPD wells gave the indications that it was not feasible to perform 
an MPD operation successfully the way the Gullfaks C well was designed. This safety 
evaluation was disregarded.  
 
Investigation reports by PSA and Statoil 
PSAs report shows that there were serious shortcomings regarding the planning of drilling 
and completion phase on the Gullfaks C 06A well, and that this easily could‟ve become a 
major accident, had the circumstances been just a little different.  
The shortcomings included aspects like risk management, management of change, experience 
sharing and transferring and knowledge and use of steering documents. 
 
Statoils internal investigation focused on processes and requirements regarding MPD 
operations, and the need to involve relevant personnel with the required competence when 
executing drilling operations (Subsea World News, 2011). The investigation also showed 
areas of improvement regarding well monitoring. In retrospect of the incident, there is now 
more focus on well integrity on the Gullfaks field, and as a result, 20 wells has been closed 
down and are now having their well integrity evaluated. 
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Conclusion 
Actions taken in retrospect of the Snorre A accident in 2004 did not seem to have the desired 
effect. In the report from PSA it is concluded that the Gullfaks accident might‟ve been 
avoided if lessons learned from the Snorre A accident were taken into account. 
The following barriers were breached on Gullfaks C: 
 
Table 11: Gullfaks C barrier breaches 
Barriers breached / Causes Comments 
Casing  Weakness / breach of casing 
Human factor  Fail to observe/act on pressure build-up 
Organization  Shortcomings in planning of drilling/completion 
phase.  
 Insufficient risk management regarding drilling 
and operations.  
 Insufficient experience transfer and use of 
relevant competence regarding MPD operations. 
 Lack of knowledge and use of steering 
documents. 
 Insufficient MOC documentation. 
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6.2.7 Elgin – 2012 
 
Summary 
On 25
th
 Mars, 2012, a gas leak was reported after a well operation on a platform in the Elgin 
field on the British sector of the North Sea, leading to evacuation of 238 workers. The well in 
question was a plugged well located at 4000m depth, but 1500m above the main reservoir. 
The gas is believed to originate from a rock formation above the well which then may have 
migrated to the well (Total, 2012).  
 
In an article mapping the Elgin field‟s challenges after start of production, it‟s stated that the 
well did not have sufficient barriers, something that has been known since 2006. The article 
explains how Total has been dependent on a constant pressure in the annulus, by means of a 
fluid column, in order to avoid gas influx from a secondary formation above the reservoir.  
It‟s clear that Total has for many years, been aware of a leak from the secondary reservoir. 
The leak is the result of a micro-annulus between the casing and the cement, most likely due 
to variations in temperature. Several wells in the area have also taken damage due to 
depletion and subsidence of the main reservoir, although the extent of these is unknown 
(Manglet barrierer på Elgin - Teknisk Ukeblad, 2012). 
 
Two ongoing operations are underway in order to regain control of the well which was 
initially releasing 200 000 m
3
 of gas every day; 
A kill operation by pumping kill mud from the wellhead, and drilling of two relief wells in 
order to intercept the well and pump kill mud directly down in the formation. 
 
On May 15
th
, the well intervention operation was completed and the leak was sealed. Once a 
cement plug has been placed, drilling of the relief wells will be stopped. 
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Figure 50: Elgin blowout (Gosden, 2012) 
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Conclusion 
The full extent of the barrier failures are at this time not known. The following barrier 
breaches are currently known: 
 
Table 12: Elgin barrier breaches 
Barriers breached / Causes Comments 
Well Isolation  Micro-annulus in cement 
Organization  Breach of regulations by not 
fulfilling 2-barrier-requirement 
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6.3 SUMMARY OF BLOWOUTS & WELL INCIDENTS 
 
The graphs on Figure 51 represent different barriers that were breached and on how many of 
the discussed well incidents they occurred on. The amount of breaches within each barrier per 
well is not listed however. The physical barrier elements usually only fail once per well, as 
oppose to the organizational barriers where multiple breaches may occur per well. 
 
 
Figure 51: Sum of barrier failures / causes of well incidents 
 
As seen on Figure 51, the majority of barrier breaches are related to the organizational 
barriers and human errors. Every well incident discussed, could be linked to inadequate 
organizational barrier integrity. In addition, several of these breaches often occur on each 
event. This indicates that even though the physical well barriers may be a direct cause of a 
well incident, there are usually flaws with the organizational procedures and human factor 
that are the underlying cause.  
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Chapter 7. Conclusion 
 
 
The few well incidents discussed in Chapter 6 only represent a small fraction of the number 
of blowouts and well incidents happening around the world. With the upcoming increase in 
petroleum activity, especially in the NCS, well integrity will be a crucial factor for avoiding 
well incidents and preventing major disasters and loss of human life. 
 
It has been claimed by several people, both politicians and leading persons within the 
petroleum industry that the Deepwater Horizon accident would not have happened in Norway 
due to the regulations and standards in use here and the way the drilling operation was 
performed. This leads to an interesting discussion whether a set of standardized regulations 
within the petroleum industry would be to prefer. At the moment, every country uses their 
own set of regulations, even UK and Norway who both operate in the same areas on the NCS. 
In the US, in addition to the federal regulations, every single state also has their own set of 
rules. This leads to inconsistencies with regards to safety within the industry, something that 
should be equally important no matter where in the world the operation takes place. 
This could be taken even further and include a common set of standards to be used, as many 
countries and operators don‟t even have standards with regards to well integrity. 
At the very least, well integrity standards on par with NORSOK D-010 should be required. 
NORSOK D-010 is an excellent example of how a standard should be constructed, as it is a 
cooperative between the government and the industry itself. This leads to a standard of high 
quality, and makes the standard more relevant and easier for the industry to follow.  
 
There are several aspects of a business unit or a company that can promote higher degree of 
well integrity and safety. In the past, the aspect of well safety and integrity was normally 
included under the drilling & operation department. The concept of having a separate well 
integrity department within a BSU is fairly new, but could contribute immensely as the focus 
and expertise is only directed towards well integrity. The use of real-time operations, or 
Integrated Operations, is also a fairly new concept that primarily focuses on increased 
efficiency and reducing cost. However, by moving personnel from offshore to onshore, and 
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by having multiple engineers with different disciplines with access to all available data, will 
also improve safety for the personnel offshore as well as improving the well integrity. 
 
Companies are required to hand over reports to the government which includes the well 
design of any planned wells as well as daily drilling reports. The actual data, which are only 
available after the well has been drilled, are not required to be reported to the government. 
Well pressures, temperature and loads and other well integrity related data are not reported. 
An example is the presence of H2S gas which can be difficult to predict, which affects the 
casing and equipment integrity, another example could be the quality of the casing cement 
job or other well barrier elements. This means that the government might not have the correct 
data when verifying and overseeing the well integrity of companies in countries where this is 
required. Maybe more well integrity related data should be required to report. 
 
Previously, many wells have been drilled and completed with insufficiencies regarding well 
barriers. Especially well isolation, or cement, has not been adequately to secure the well. 
Companies have often used sub-par solutions and equipment or insufficient cement height in 
order to save money. Something to consider is that the amount of money saved by avoiding a 
well incident or a blowout greatly outweighs the cost of an extra barrier, better equipment or 
an extra person. 
 
Hopefully the importance of well integrity will continue to grow throughout the industry the 
coming years, as well as the knowledge and competence of everyone involved, from a global 
and national level, down to company and personal level. Perhaps one day, major well 
incidents like the Deepwater Horizon and those similar will be a thing of the past.
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Appendix A 
 
 
Figure 52: Well Barrier Schematic illustration in NORSOK D-010 (NORSOK Standard D-010, 2004) 
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Appendix B 
 
Figure 53: Example of a Well Barrier Acceptance table in NORSOK D-010 (NORSOK Standard D-010, 
2004) 
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Appendix C 
 
The total downwards pressure in the well is given by; 
(Water gradient * TVD Water) + (Sandaband gradient * TVD Sandaband) + (Sandaband 
Yield * MD Sandaband) 
 
 
Figure 54: Pressure calculations for Embla D-07 Sandaband (Sandaband, 2010) 
 
 
Water gradient:    0,445 psi/ft  3820 psi 
Sandaband gradient:    0,931 psi/ft  4155 psi 
Yield (with safety factor):   4055 psi/1,3  3119,2 psi  
Total downwards pressure (with SF):  11094,2 psi 
Reservoir pressure:    10800 psi 
 
Net overpressure:    294,2 psia 
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